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18 May 1981

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1751

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POLL ON ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR, PEACE, OTHER COUNTRIES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 16 Apr 81 p 3

[Article: "Many Dutchmen Fear Nuclear Arms Most"]

[Text] Nijmegen, 16 April--Forty percent of all Dutchmen who consider the Soviet Union a serious military threat believe that deployment of nuclear arms in our country poses an even greater threat. This was revealed by a poll which the Study Center for Peace Problems of the Catholic University of Nijmegen asked the Nipo [Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion] to conduct. The results of this investigation have been used in a study published this week under the title "Image of the Enemy in The Netherlands."

This poll shows that opponents of nuclear arms are also very much opposed to expansion of nuclear power facilities. The same is true for opponents of nuclear energy. To the 553 persons which the Nipo characterized as representative and interviewed, the loss of their job is less of a threat than nuclear energy. With 32 percent nuclear power scored highest as most threatening to their personal well-being, followed by the threat of war with 25 percent, the arms race with 18 percent, and loss of employment and income with 10 percent.

One-half of those interviewed find the North-South conflict (rich against poor nations) a greater threat than the East-West relationship (capitalism and communism). Intolerance toward communism appears to be quite considerable: 45 percent of those questioned do not want to have anything at all to do with communism.

Almost one-third of all Dutchmen would tolerate a communist member in the family. More than one-fourth of all Dutchmen find admittance of communists to the government "not absolutely unacceptable." This form of intolerance diminishes with the age of the persons questioned. Only 7 percent uphold the slogan "rather dead than red." However, the poll also shows that the people's image of communism is closely related to their fear of a military threat by the Soviet Union. It is also clear that a Dutchman's view of the Soviet leaders is a lot more negative than their view of the Russian people.

Dutchmen attribute more positive than negative characteristics to themselves as compared to other nations. Almost 70 percent consider the Netherlands a peaceful country, but not even one-fourth of all people interviewed believe the same to be true for the FRG. The United States scored as regards peacefulness not more

than 22 percent and the Soviet Union had to be content with 7 percent. These percentages became even smaller, quite remarkably also for America, after the Russian intervention in Afghanistan. The credibility of the United States as a peace-loving nation diminished by one-third, to 14 percent.

As regards matters related to war and peace the knowledgeability of interviewed Dutchmen appeared to be disappointing. Only 41 percent knew that SS-20 denotes a missile. The name Interdenominational Peace Conference (IKV) scored a little higher (44 percent). One out of every nine Dutchmen believes that this abbreviation stands for International Communist League. The idea of SALT is known to 37 percent of the people, and almost 80 percent of all Dutchmen know what the H-bomb is.

10319
CSO: J103

FUTURE ENERGY NEEDS MUST BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT 8 Apr 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Keeping an Eye on the Major Power Plant Venture"]

[Text] The energy supply guidelines chosen for Finland in the 1960's have placed our country--in relative measure--to the forefront of the states using nuclear power. However, on the level of political decision making, views on increasing the use of nuclear power have become more confused as the waste disposal and safety problems have turned out to be more difficult than estimated. Also, conflicting views have started to appear regarding the categorical cost advantage of the nuclear power over other forms of energy.

In actuality, the establishment of long-range guidelines for energy supply has become more complicated than it was when the first nuclear power plant was purchased. For good reason, the national economy moralists have been confronted with claims that we are technologically ill-prepared for the use of nuclear power. The more strenuously we have had to strive to shove the unresolved waste problems to other countries, the more these apprehensions have been growing.

In this kind of a situation, it seems a questionable solution to continue to depend on nuclear power in planning the basic energy production. However, it appears that such a decision is currently taking shape since Imatran Voima is developing plans for a new major nuclear power plant with full speed.

There is good reason to remind the Diet and the Council of State of the fact that the next major power plant decision is a national matter. The energy policy history of our country must not repeat itself: major power plant decisions must not be sprung on the highest decision makers as surprises.

The responsibilities involved with increased use of nuclear power are enormous and are not confined within national boundaries. As long as the nuclear power plant waste problems and safety risks exist, the Finns cannot advance in the use of nuclear power without for instance elevating the Radiation Safety Institute to such a powerful status that the control measures can be trusted.

9571

CSO: 3107/75

PAPER COMMENTS ON REPORT COMPARING COAL, NUCLEAR POWER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT 6 Apr 81 p 2

[Editorial: "The Vanishing Advantages of Nuclear Power"]

[Text] The Ministry of Trade and Industry has compared the costs of alternative ways of producing electricity and has come up with an interesting conclusion: It is as expensive to produce electricity with nuclear power as with coal. The study opens up new directions for the energy policy debate as, until now, nuclear power has been considered to be the most advantageous alternative in the production of electricity.

Politically, the management of Finland's electricity production is now at a pleasant standstill. The present capacity is sufficient, and the decision on the building of the next major power plant is not due until after a couple of years. However, this does not mean that we can tarry with the establishment of the groundwork for the decision, because it will involve determining all energy policies for the future.

Until now, nuclear power has been touted as categorically the most economical solution as compared with the other modes of production. Nevertheless, although economic considerations have constituted a serious justification in favor of nuclear power, the decision-making has become more complicated in recent years because new apprehensions have arisen over risks involved with the use of nuclear power.

Power plants using coal have been presented as an alternative but more expensive solution. Although they incessantly pollute the environment, this has not been considered to be a risk on a par with those involved with the use of nuclear power.

The Ministry's study is worth attention from the point of view of the energy debate, because it eliminates in a way one of the difficulties involved with the decision-making. The closer equivalency of costs that has now been proved strongly tilts the decision on the power plant towards coal. Actually, the only important advantage now left in favor of nuclear power is the higher certainty of the availability in crisis situations when fuel import might become difficult.

However, there is one reason to regard the Ministry's study with a grain of salt: It does not show the recent increases in the price of coal. As far as establishing

the energy policy guidelines is concerned, the sudden overheating of the coal markets can hardly be considered very symptomatic or essential, since the long-range availability of coal seems to be assured. At the moment, it is only a question of a state of technical unpreparedness in the areas where the coal demand is now directed because of the Polish difficulties.

At any rate, regardless of the fact that the situation has changed somewhat, the study reflects the development of total expenses for different energy forms. It is precisely these kinds of evaluations that are important when decisions are made that have influence far into the future.

9571

CSO; 3107/75

POLISH STRIKES HURT COAL SUPPLY; ELECTRICITY TO BE IMPORTED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Apr 81 p 33

[Text] Porvoo (HS) Coal's share of the production of electricity is diminishing noticeably this year. For example, Imatran Voima [IVO] has only one month's full-capacity supply of coal at its Inkoo power plant.

At maximum capacity, the Inkoo storage fields can stock up to 1.8 million tons of coal, but at the moment, the stock is only less than 300,000 tons. However, it is believed at IVO that long-range agreements will make it possible to increase the amount of stock to 1 million tons.

It is possible to substitute nuclear power and direct import of electricity for coal imports, but some uncertainties are involved with both of these solutions as well.

IVO no longer counts on Polish coal deliveries to any great extent.

In the past year, the nuclear power plants proved themselves to be rather unreliable. IVO was able to produce in 1980 only about 15 percent of the total electricity production by nuclear power, whereas the goal has been set at twice that amount. It is expected that nuclear power's share will rise to 25 to 30 percent of the total this year.

It is now possible to import electricity from the Soviet Union with 350 MW maximum capacity. The Soviet Union has not finished the building of the continuous current link which is the prerequisite for full capacity transfer of electricity. Because of this, power plants in the Leningrad area have been engaged for the purpose of exporting electricity to Finland.

The Soviet Union has now promised that the sorely needed continuous current link will be ready in May. It would then be possible to receive 520 MW of electricity, which is equivalent to the amount produced by one nuclear power plant.

The current excellent water situation is a great source of satisfaction for the people connected with power production. The Vuoksi and Kymijoki waterways now have twice the normal amount of snow.

9571

CSO: 3107/75

COAL IMPORTERS FORM POOL TO DEAL WITH SHORTAGES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Apr 81 p 28

[Text] Formation of a cooperative pool by several coal importers will be officially announced early next week. The new company will be called Hiilivirta Oy, and it will have 11 members at the beginning stage.

The following companies are involved in this concerted coal import enterprise: A. Ahlstrom, Kotkan Hoivryvoima, Lohja, Lansi-rannikon Voima, Myllykoski, Nokia, Partek, Serlachius, Suomen Sokeri, Tampella, and Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat.

As far as is known, the company will be established officially on Tuesday, and according to the current plans, business activities are to commence early next fall.

The early import goal for the Hiilivirta Oy has been set at 500,000 tons per year. The company intends to use 60,000 to 70,000-ton vessels in long-distance transport, as this is believed to create "sufficiently high" savings.

During the preparatory stages, the preliminary estimates have indicated that cooperative transport of coal will produce the importers savings of U.S. \$5-10 (20-40 Finnish marks) per ton.

There have been earlier rumors that industries are planning to form several different coal pools. However, it appears that for the time being, this one company only will be used to garner experience.

At present, Finland consumes about 4.5 million tons of coal in a year. Of this amount, about 1.7 million tons were purchased last year by industry. It has been estimated that by 1985, industrial coal consumption will have risen to nearly 3 million tons a year.

The average price of import coal last year was 207 Finnish marks per ton. However, this figure does not any more reflect a truthful picture of the present price of coal, as the final quotation last year was already as high as 270 Finnish marks per ton.

9571

CSO: 3107/75

BRIEFS

ENERGY'S ECONOMIC COST EFFECTS--According to the research department of the National Board of Trade and Consumer Interests, the development of the general price level continues to be dominated by the rising cost of energy. According to the most recent price survey, the increased cost of energy was the immediate cause for two-fifths of the rise of the basic domestic price level between February last year and February this year. Energy commodities went up by an average of 43 percent during the past 12 months, while other commodities in the basic price index of the domestic market went up by 12 percent on an average. About two-thirds of the increase in import prices during the past 12 months were directly caused by the rising cost of energy, mainly fuel oil. The import prices of energy commodities have increased on an average by 43 percent, whereas other import goods have gone up only 8 percent. It is noted in the price survey that, as a part of the overall income policy solution, an agreement was made to voluntarily withhold from raising prices before mid-May. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT 2 Apr 81 p 30] 9571

USSR BUILDING HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT--It appears likely that within the next few months, the Soviet Union will order from Finland a hydraulic power plant at an approximated cost of 1 billion Finnish francs. According to Erkki Vaara, the Finnish chairman of the bilateral energy study group, the Soviets are willing to start the actual negotiations on the order during the month of April. The volume of the power plant has been estimated to be 180-200 megawatts, and the intended site is the Vaarakoski rapids of the Kemijoki river in Russian Karelia. The final cost of the enterprise will only be cleared up when an agreement has been reached on the size of the power plant. Mr Vaara, who returned from Moscow on Sunday, noted that the cost and size are still left open, but that the "negotiations have proceeded a good way." During the fifth meeting of the energy study group of the Finnish-USSR Cooperation Commission, discussions were also conducted on the willingness of the Soviet Union to deliver equipment for remote heat plants to be constructed in Finland. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT 6 Apr 81 p 28] 9571

CSO: 3107/75

EQUIVALENT ENERGY PRODUCTION STRATEGIES DEBATED

Paris CEA NOTES D'INFORMATION in French Jan-Feb 81 pp 12-16

[Article by Robert Lattès and Lucien Thiriet: "Macroeconomic, Monetary, and Social Impacts of Equivalent Energy Production Strategies"]

[Text] The present paper summarizes a study by the two authors published by the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission]. That study revises and updates a prior report published in February 1979. The following text does not, of course, recapitulate all analyses and comparisons made in the study.

Because of considerable and repeated oil price rises, it is to be feared that the French oil bill could bring about a permanent structural trade imbalance, with heavy consequences, one of which would be the relative impoverishment of the country due to the need to export a growing production of relatively declining value.

But a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power station avoids the consumption of nearly 1.5 million tons of oil yearly, and saves over one billion francs yearly in foreign exchange. The nuclear program thus appears as a powerful non-monetary or financial means to contribute to the restoration of major balances, thereby also protecting the currency, and through it employment, living standards, and political independence.

The present report updates a prior report of February 1979, and contributes a number of new elements: it provides a comparative analysis of worldwide impacts, particularly on major balances, of equivalent but different energy strategies or policies. More precisely, we examine in depth how energy strategies might be able to ease external constraints: that is, permit greater growth and reduce unemployment without increasing, or even while reducing, the external deficit.

The study has adopted as a referent electricity generating program--using coal, fuel, or uranium--a program approximating the French nuclear program for the medium and long term (Table 1 a). Thus all results obtained reflect a very concrete practical meaning.

We have, of course, taken care that the relationship of electricity production to total energy needs should keep within realistic thresholds, and likewise with the relationship of electricity production by nuclear means to total electricity production.

Because of the second oil shock, we have herein adopted the coal program as a basis of reference for purposes of comparison, for it appears to us likely that power stations using fuel oil will no longer be built, and moreover that those existing are destined progressively to disappear, yielding to other energy sources.

Given below are a few essential results:

Fuel Expenditures

The nuclear strategy permits considerable savings in fuel expenditures, with two very important consequences:

Since fuel is totally imported in the case of oil, almost totally in the case of coal, but only partially in the case of uranium, there is--in addition to the strong contribution to an adverse trade balance in the first two cases--a risk of aggravation of that deficit in the event of a price increase for foreign fuels. Such aggravation is negligible in the nuclear case. Moreover, that deficit or its aggravation is increased by any decline in currency value, which itself flows from that deficit, which is much more limited and less threatened by increases in the nuclear case;

Fuel prices are less well controlled in the case of oil and coal than in the nuclear case. Moreover, since the fuel component in the price per kWh is much less in the nuclear case, the risks and the extent of the consequences of the same fuel price increase on the price per kWh are infinitely lower in the nuclear case.

Thus we note that in comparison to a coal program, the nuclear program will save, in yearly operating expenditures, 30 billion Fr in 1985, 50 in 1990, and 84 in 2000.

As for cumulative cash flows, they would be respectively in 1990 and 2000: 106 and 333 billion Fr with coal; 377 and 869 billion Fr with the nuclear program. The internal economic performance of the coal program would be 4.04 percent, whereas that of the nuclear program is 16.37 percent.

Foreign Exchange Expenditures

The proportion of energy sector imports in total French imports--which was nearly 30 percent in 1980--calls very special attention to the foreign exchange balance sheet of electric power generating programs.

Thus, for a given electric power program, total foreign exchange needs for the nuclear option are but 21 percent compared with those for the coal option, and 11.4 percent compared with those for the oil fuel option. But mention must also be made of the differences in foreign exchange requirements as between two identical electric power programs, for such differences directly affect trade balances. The coal-nuclear differential in favor of the nuclear option, yearly, would be 18 billion Fr in 1985, 30 in 1990, 40 in 1995, and 51 in 2000.

Alternatively, without the French nuclear program, the adverse trade balance for 1980 would have risen by 4 to 8 billion Fr, according to the arbitrage which would have been settled on between coal and fuel oil.

Energy Expenditures With Various Options

This concerns both "invested" energy and energy needed for the operation of the various programs. Total energy expenditures for oil fuel or coal programs are naturally much greater than for the nuclear program.

In millions of tons of oil equivalent, the cumulative coal-nuclear spread is favor of the nuclear option comes to 133 for 1985, 417 for 1990, and 1354 for 2000. Put in different terms, cumulative energy savings with the nuclear, as compared to the coal option, would by 1990 almost double the total annual energy needs of France as estimated for that period, and by 2000 would be over 4 times that figure. In fact, the energy yield of the program, that is: the production of electrical energy in Mtep divided by the energy expenditures for electricity production (input and operating) in Mtep, remains below unity for oil fuel and coal, whereas it will exceed 150 percent as early as 1985 for the nuclear option, reaching 702 percent in 1995 and 300 percent in 2000. That was predictable, since in the one case oil fuel or coal, as primary forms of energy, are destroyed, while uranium cannot be used directly as primary energy, and hence has no intrinsic value. Moreover--though this factor has not been considered herein--spent uranium contains, in the form of plutonium, a very high level of potential energy, and thus has very considerable energy value, while spent coal and oil fuel no longer contain anything and have no energy or economic value.

Energy Policy and Major Balances

For each energy strategy there are corresponding differential variations in gross domestic product, which are not negligible, in favor of the nuclear option.

A synthesis of all the foregoing results shows that energy policy, and particularly intensification of nuclear programs, permits modification of the structural growth and employment level, in relation to which the external balance is attained (or imbalance kept within certain limits).

Thus, in retrospect, if a program of power stations burning imported coal had been substituted for the planned nuclear program which is now in progress, there would have been more than 400,000 additional unemployed in the period 1980-84.

On the other hand, intensification of the nuclear program makes it possible in time to cushion the adverse effects on the balance of payments occasioned by a revival of economic activity.

If the nuclear program had been replaced by an oil fuel program (to produce electricity or heat), the same evolution of external constraints on France which actually occurred would have required less economic growth, and would have been simultaneously reflected by increased unemployment, since it would have been necessary to import more oil for that program, while keeping within the prior limits set by external constraints.

It is in fact much the same thing to import increasing quantities of oil at a constant price as to import fixed quantities at increasing prices, and that is indeed what has been done for several years. Other things being equal, increasing OPEC prices diminish growth and aggravate unemployment.

Energy Independence Indicators

One essential indicator is the portion of energy assured, in relation to overall energy policy, without recourse to imports.

The energy prospects adopted are those shown in Table II.

Two hypotheses have been considered: the first assuming that one-half, and the second assuming that two-thirds of the needed uranium is imported.

Four electricity-producing options have been analyzed:

A. The nuclear program is carried out as planned;

B. The nuclear program planned from 1980 to the target dates considered (1985, 1990, and 2000) is entirely replaced by a program of power stations using imported coal;

C. The planned nuclear program is reduced by 15 percent, starting in 1980, in relation to option A, and electricity demands are met by additional recourse to coal imports;

D. The nuclear program is accelerated by 15 percent, from 1980, in relation to option A, and electricity demands are met by reduced recourse to imported coal.

Table III gives the degree of independence for each of the four energy strategies considered--A, B, C, and D--under both assumptions as to uranium imports.

A 25 percent use of breeder reactors by the end of the century, as part of the nuclear strategy, would of course permit an appreciable increase in the degree of independence, that is: 35.19 percent for option A under assumption 1, and 41.73 percent for option D under assumption 2.

Thus for France the degree of energy dependence will in any event remain high until 2000, even with:

intensification of the nuclear program by 15 to 20 percent, correlated with a policy of substitution and penetration for the desired electricity;

A 25 percent use of breeder reactors by the end of the century;

Maximum development of other assured sources within the national territory, such as solar, geothermal, and tidal energy; renewed use of low-grade coal deposits difficult of access; and possible use of nuclear-generated electricity to produce synthetic hydrocarbons from biomass or coal;

Economies in energy use, which implicitly are already considerable in Table II.

It would then appear very difficult for the degree of independence to exceed 55 to 60 percent.

Price of Energy and Price of Electricity

These two prices have a marked influence on the overall economy and on all major balances, and consequently also on the competitiveness of goods--and to a lesser extent of services--on both the foreign and domestic markets. Whence the importance of exercising maximum control over the price of energy, which means in fact, and particularly for a country such as France, the price of its electricity. From this standpoint the nuclear program appears as a key element in stabilizing the price of a kWh, even if the price of uranium should rise sharply. Here then is an independence indicator which reflects the fact that the cost of this energy, with all its economic impact, is less dependent on external vicissitudes over which we have in practice little or no influence.

We note the extensive role which a nuclear program can play in contributing to the loosening of external constraints, and the consequences this can have for economic growth and employment, while at the same time permitting a much better control and a much lowered cost of electricity.

Moreover, another problem can be brought to light which, though fundamental, has not hitherto received all needed attention: that of spinoff.


Supposing an energy saving program is applied, the savings will be reflected simultaneously by other economic activities, possibly requiring investments, and by diversion to other activities of the financial savings effected.

These other activities, and those changed allocations, will in turn imply energy expenditures, and imports, energy-related or not, which will affect the major balances, but also modify other factors such as employment, the currency, exports, etc.

The balance sheet of an energy-saving program is thus multifaceted: to lay down an overall energy policy with the sole objective of minimizing consumption or importation of energy might very well produce results harmful to other essential sectors. Any study of energy savings should be accompanied by an analysis in depth of related effects, which the energy-saving policy should take into account.

Cumulated Cash Flows Under Various Electric Power Production Programs:

(1) MILLIARDS DE FRANCS



Key:

1. Billions of Fr.
2. Nuclear
3. Coal
4. Oil fuel


Table

I: Base Program for Installed Generating Power:

Year:	1980	1985	1990	2000
GigaWatts:	12.8	38	61	101


*G = Giga = Billion = 10^9

Annual Foreign Exchange Expenditures for Power Generating Programs:



Key:

1. In billions of Fr
2. Oil fuel
3. Coal
4. Nuclear



Total Cumulated Energy Expenditures (operating and investment) for Nuclear, Fuel Oil, and Coal Programs:

Key:

1. Billions of Petroleum-Ton Equivalents
2. Oil fuel
3. Coal
4. Nuclear

Table II. Total Energy Requirements in Billions of Petroleum-Ton Equivalents

Key:

1. Coal
2. Oil
3. Gas
4. New energy sources
5. Hydraulic
6. Nuclear

		1979	%	1980	%	1985	%	1990	%	2000	%
Charbon	(1)	34.5	18.1	34.7	17.8	39.7	17.7	44.7	17.4	54.7	16.8
Pétrole	(2)	108.5	56.9	131.0	67.2	119.9	53.5	112.4	43.7	120.1	36.8
Gaz	(3)	23.0	12.1								
Energies nouvelles	(4)			0.3	0.1	2.0	0.9	9.7	3.8	12.0	3.7
Hydraulique	(5)	16.0	8.4	16.0	8.2	16.0	7.2	16.0	6.2	16.0	4.9
Nucléaire	(6)	8.5	4.5	13.0	6.7	46.4	20.7	74.4	28.9	123.2	37.8
Total		190.5	100.0	195.0	100.0	224.0	100.0	257.2	100.0	326.0	100.0
Électricité (TWh)		230.8		250		346		419		654	

Table III. Degree of Independence (percentage)

	(1)	NUCLEAIRE	1980	1985	1990	2000
A	Prévu (2)	Hypothèse 1 (3)	22.56	28.44	32.35	33.47
		Hypothèse 2 "	21.44	25.00	27.53	27.18
B	Supprimé (4)		19.23	18.08	17.88	14.57
C	- 15 %	Hypothèse 1	22.13	27.10	30.46	31.00
		Hypothèse 2	21.15	24.02	26.21	25.40
D	+ 15 %	Hypothèse 1	23.73	29.99	34.52	36.30
		Hypothèse 2	22.44	25.94	28.88	28.89

Key: 1. Nuclear; 2. Planned; 3. Assumptions 1 & 2;
4. Eliminated

6145

CSO: 310C/679

OFFICIAL PRICE LISTINGS FOR OIL, GAS PRODUCTS

New Price List

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 6 Mar 81 pp 201-203

[Text] Decree 11/1981. Prices of Petroleum Products. GAZZETTA UFFICIALE No. 59 of 28 February 1981.

The Interministerial Price Committee [CIP]:

In view of Legislative Decrees No. 347 of 19 October 1944 and No. 363 of 23 April 1946, issued by the governing bodies in place; Legislative Decrees No. 283 of 22 April 1947 and No. 896 of 15 September 1947, issued by the Acting Head of State, and subsequent provisions;

In view of CIP Administrative Measures No. 1/1981 of 13 January 1981;

In view of CIP Administrative Measure No. 8/1980 of 19 March 1980 which sets forth the new criteria for the determination of maximum prices for petroleum products;

In view of CIP Administrative Measure No. 10/1981 of 27 February;

Considering the existing gap between the average ex-refinery proceeds from government-priced products in Italy, as compared with those in Europe;

Having heard the views expressed by the Central Price Commission (Art. 2 of Legislative Decree No. 347 of 19 October 1944 issued by the governing body in place) in the meeting of 27 February 1981;

Decrees,

With effect from the date of publication of the present Administrative Measure in the GAZZETTA UFFICIALE, the maximum prices for the petroleum products indicated herein below to be as follows:

A) Products for Automotive Use

		<u>Premium Gasoline</u>	<u>Regular Gasoline</u>	<u>Gasoil</u>
Prices ex refinery (coast or interior) or coast depot, VAT [value-added tax] excluded:				
IF [excise tax] included	lire/m ³	679,924	654,544	286,535
IF excluded	"	282,394	257,014	270,235
Consumer prices, ex city filling station operator, IF and VAT included	lire/liter	870	835	370
Prices to suppliers of roadside and highway filling station operators for sales totaling between 200,001 and 3,000,000 liters annually, IF and VAT included	"	705.15	679.15	305.15

The terms of fuel sales outlet price agreements, prices to operators of filling stations that dispense quantities smaller than 200,001 liters annually or greater than 3,000,000 liters annually, prices to operators of sales outlets who are "backed" according to the definition stipulated in paragraph A), point 3 of Administrative Measure No. 9/1980, and the terms of sale of fuels under the self-service system, are determined by independent negotiations between the parties.

For all fuels, the posting of the indication of the type of product (premium gasoline, regular gasoline, gasoil) on the dispensing pump is obligatory.

B) Products for Other Than Automotive Uses

1. Prices ex coastal refinery or coastal depot, IF and VAT excluded:	<u>Lire/m³</u>
Premium gasoline and products of similar category	282,394
Regular gasoline and products of similar category	257,014
Gasoil and products of similar category	270,235
Kerosene and products of similar category	258,375
Fuel oil (50° C viscosity):	
Very fluid to 3° E and products of similar category	283,000
Fluid above 3° E to 5° E and products of similar category	243,190
Semifluid above 5° E to 7° E and products of similar category	240,460

2. Surcharge for sales from inland supply points (at distances greater than 25 km from coast):

	From 1 April to 30 September		From 1 October to 31 March	
	Gasoil and Kerosene Lire/m ³	Fluid and Semifluid Fuel Oil Lire/Ton	Gasoil and Kerosene Lire/m ³	Fluid and Semifluid Fuel Oil Lire/Ton
a) From inland refinery and from inland depot (linked to coast by oil pipeline).....	1,000	1,150	2,000	2,300
b) From inland depots linked to inland refineries by oil pipeline:				
Depots up to 25 km from refinery.....	1,400	1,600	2,100	2,800
Depots over 25 km from refinery.....	2,000	2,300	2,900	3,450

3. Consumer prices:

3.1) Products for heating uses.

The CPP's [Provincial Price Committees] set the consumer prices, valid throughout the territory of the province, to retailers for kerosene and to the consumer's home for gasoil and fluid and semifluid fuel oils.

These prices are determined by adding the following prices ex refinery or depot inclusive of excise tax: gasoil 286,535 lire/m³, kerosene 268,375 lire/m³, fluid fuel oil 250,490 lire/ton, semifluid fuel oil 246,710 lire/ton, the surcharges stipulated in point 2) under this heading, and the surcharge relative to hauling cost per full tank trailer, calculated with reference to the average of the distances between the inland wholesale depots of the province and the bases from which they are supplied, taking into account the transportation tariffs stipulated in CIP Circular, Reference Number 13360 of 19 September 1980. To deal with exceptional situations of product shortages in the province, the CPP's may take into account longer distances for supplies from noncustomary bases.

For kerosene sold in 20-liter returnable cannisters secured by deposit, the price ex retailer is determined by adding to the above-calculated value the following surcharges:

For expenses relative to packaging in canisters, VAT excluded, per canister	535 lire
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For the cost of transporting 20-liter cannisters
from the wholesale depot to the retailer's
place of business, VAT excluded, per cannister 290 lire

For retailer's margin, VAT excluded, per cannister 400 "

The retailer is required to post in full view, the price list showing the maximums established by this Administrative Measure and the maximum price set by the CPP.

The retailer may add a charge commensurate with the service rendered, for delivery of cannisters of kerosene to customers' homes.

For gasoil and fluid and semifluid heating oil, the prices delivered at customers' homes are determined by adding to the above-calculated values the following surcharges:

	<u>Gasoil Lire/m³</u>	<u>Fluid and Semifluid Fuel Oil Lire/Ton</u>
For partial deliveries not exceeding 2,000 liters	20,500	24,500
For partial deliveries not exceeding 4,000 liters	19,100	23,000
For partial deliveries of over 4,000 liters	16,700	20,000
For deliveries by tank trailer	10,900	13,000

The CPP's will indicate separately in the price provisions issued by them the maximum selling price not including the VAT and the maximum selling price including the VAT.

3.2) Products for use by agriculture, fishing and small-scale shipping:

These prices will be determined by adding to the values calculated in accordance with points 1) and 2) above the following surcharges:

For sales ex wholesale depot located, with respect
to their customary supply base:

Within 30 km	3,600 lire/m ³
Within 31 to 70 km	5,200 "
More than 70 km away	7,900 "

For sales to consumers ex reseller's depot (agriculture) and ex fueling installation (fishing and small-scale shipping), these prices may be increased by 11,000 lire/m³.

For sales delivered to consumer's home, a surcharge may be added equal to actual and documented cost of transportation from the point at which dispensed to the customer's home.

"Fishing and small-scale shipping" are understood to mean: a) fishing vessels of Italian registry, without limit as to tonnage; b) all other vessels, except sports vessels, of Italian registry and of gross tonnage up to 500 tons, and that operate within ports or that have as their destination domestic ports and that are entitled to tax exemptions; c) Navy vessels of gross tonnage up to 800 tons.

The above prices do not include remuneration payable to customs personnel, which must be documented and shown separately in billings.

3.3) Products for Other Uses

For sales to point of delivery at customer's home, the prices calculated in accordance with points 1) and 2) above may be increased by the amount of all documented costs incurred in effecting the reference delivery, as well as the relative excise taxes.

C) Wholesale Terms of Sale

In wholesale-quantity sales, coastal refineries shall deduct from maximum sale prices for the transfer of these quantities to coastal depots: 1,750 lire/m³ for gasoline, gasoil and kerosene; and 1,650 lire/ton for fluid and semifluid fuel oils. The said refineries shall also deduct from the price to the wholesaler the cabotage expenses actually incurred by the wholesaler in effecting the delivery to his depot.

The cabotage discount is not applicable when the merchandise moves within the ambit of the same overseer or when the merchandise is moved by means of pipeline between coastal refinery and coastal depot.

D) General and Concluding Provisions

No compensation is owing for the pouring off into drums or canisters owned by the customer, or for the rental of drums or canisters owned by the seller.

The sale prices for bulk merchandise sales may be increased by 1,750 lire/m³ for automotive fuels and by 1,650 lire/ton for fuel oils and for kerosene to be used for heating, when the merchandise is dispensed in returnable drums owned by the reseller and secured by deposit.

In determinations of fair charges and when unusual conditions of a special nature are involved, the GPP's will examine, case by case, the appropriateness of setting different prices for those localities in the province that are found unduly disadvantaged with regard to supply.

The CPP's will proceed within 15 days of the effective date of this Administrative Measure to regularize the local sale prices, which will have the same effective date as this Administrative Measure.

A copy of their administrative measures will be transmitted to the CIP.

Dealers and retailers are required to post in full view in premises used for sales a copy of the official list of resale and consumer prices.

The state and municipal control bodies will enforce the obligation in question.

The CPP's shall include in the administrative measures issued by them the regulations on prices of sales to the public contained in the present Administrative Measure, to contribute to maximum dissemination and awareness of their provisions.

Until such time as the governmental bodies concerned shall revise the legislative and regulatory provisions to change the system of preferentially treated fuel allocations from a weight to a volume basis, business firms may, in billing on a weight basis, base unit prices of products to be used in agriculture, under the letters B.3 (gasoline), C.1 (kerosene) and E.4 (gasoil) of Table A of D.L. 989 of 23 October 1964 transformed with revisions by Law 1350 of 18 December 1964, on the values of respective densities given under Point E) of CIP Administrative Measure 67/1979 of 29 December 1979.

E) Characteristics of Petroleum Products

The characteristics of petroleum products must correspond to those given in the CUNA tables as follows:

Premium gasoline	CUNA table	NC 623-01	of 19 February 1981
Regular gasoline	" "	NC 620-01	" " " "
Automotive gasoil	" "	NC 630-01	" 14 April 1977
Automotive kerosene	" "	NC 627-01	" " " "

The effective dates of application shown in the tables are also valid.

LPG [Liquefied Petroleum Gas] (propane, butane and their mixtures)

A) For bulk merchandise, ex SIF-SIVA [expansion unknown] refinery with saturated or unsaturated propane (hydrocarbon C₃) content:

1) not less in volume than 20 percent of the mixture	lire/ton	332,636
2) not less in volume than 85 percent of the mixture (commercial propane).....	"	344,636
3) less in volume than 20 percent of the mixture (commercial butane).....	"	329,636

The above-indicated prices are increased by 15,000 lire/ton, this surcharge owing to the adjustment fund for the transport of LPG, for merchandise placed on the consumer market, whether for uses for which the excise tax has been paid or for which it is excise-tax-exempt.

Owners of wholesale depots are entitled to a discount of 1,500 lire/ton from the above prices. Where annual purchases from the same supplier exceed 10,000 tons, the discount is 2,500 lire/ton.

B) LPG for household use (as fuel in uses other than automotive):

1) Sale prices for merchandise sold in steel bottles:

--containing a net weight of LPG greater than 7 kg and up to 24 kg:

to the reseller, delivered to his warehouse, VAT excluded.....	lire/kg	575
to the consumer, ex reseller's warehouse, for merchandise loaded on the buyer's vehicle, 8 percent VAT included.....	"	730

--containing a net weight of LPG greater than 24 kg:

to the reseller, delivered to his warehouse, VAT excluded.....	"	571
to the consumer, ex reseller's warehouse, for merchandise loaded on the buyer's vehicle, 15 percent VAT included.....	"	737

For bottles containing a net weight of commercial propane exceeding 24 kg, the price stipulated above may be increased by 12 lire/kg.

2) Until 30 March 1991, for the delivery of bottles to the consumer's domicile equipped with supporting mountings, and after verifying the delivery by means of the household apparatus for which it is to be used, or for the removal and taking back of the empty bottle, the consumer may be charged a fee commensurate with the services rendered but in case greater than 1,500 lire (VAT included) per bottle.

After that date, the CPP's will, for the area within their purview, adjust the transportation costs based on the various local distribution requirements, even though through the determination of greater zonal adjustments, which shall be decreed on 3) March and 3) September of each year.

3) The retailer is required to post in full view of the public the notice showing, in type faces of equal weight, the sale price ex retail establishment and the price delivered to the consumer's domicile for the various packagings.

C) LPG for automotive use:

to the consumer ex roadside pump station, VAT included.... lire/liter 575

to the roadside and highway pump station operator for
annual sales between 200,001 and 3,000,000 liters.

VAT excluded..... " 470.70

The sale prices of fuel to the small-scale operators who dispense overall quantities of less than 200,001 liters annually and greater than 3,000,000 liters annually remain open to free negotiation between the parties.

For the conversion of prices from weight units to volume units of LPG, the density of 0.565 kg/liter at 15° C.

The sale prices of LPG for automotive to resellers and to operators are based on a mixture containing not less than 25 percent propane. Whenever the percentage of propane is less than 25 percent or greater than 30 percent, the billing firm shall bill the product on the basis of its actual density at 15° C and specify the density on the related documentation.

D) LPG for industrial use (uses stipulated in Art. 16 of Law 1161 of 15 December 1971):

The sale price for bulk merchandise ex refinery, SV-SIVA, stipulated under points 1), 2) and 3) sub A) may be increased for deliveries to the using installation but solely to the extent of the transport costs actually incurred and documentable.

Methane, LPG Tariff Adjustments

Rome PASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 6 Mar 81 p 204

[Text] Decree No. 10/1981. Adjustment of LPG surcharge and regulations relative to the operation of the LPG Transport Adjustment Fund. (GAZZETTA UFFICIALE No. 59 of 28 February 1981).

The Interministerial Price Committee [CIP]:

In view of Legislative Decrees No. 347 of 19 October 1944 and No. 363 of 23 April 1946, issued by the governing bodies in place;

In view of Legislative Decrees No. 283 of 22 April 1947 and 296 of 15 September 1946, issued by the Acting Head of State, and subsequent provisions;

In view of Legislative Decree No. 98 of 26 January 1948;

In view of CIP Administrative Measure No. 44 dated 28 October 1977 relative to the institution and operating rules and regulations of the LPG Transport Adjustment Fund;

Having found that freight rates and costs of importing LPG [Liquefied Petroleum Gas] rose substantially during the past year with adverse effects on the financial situation of the aforementioned LPG Transportation Adjustment Fund, creating an imbalance between its income and output;

Having found that to enable the Adjustment Fund to continue carrying out its institutional purposes it is necessary to increase the surcharge for LPG produced in and imported into Italy and to also establish criteria designed to avoid freight-cost inequalities, as well as to institute corrections to CIP Administrative Measure No. 44/1977 designed to obtain improved and more efficient operation of the Adjustment Fund;

Having heard the views expressed by the Central Price Commission (Art. 2 of Legislative Decree No. 347 of 19 October 1944 issued by the governing body in place) at the meeting of 27 February 1981;

In agreement with the Ministry of the Treasury;

Decreases:

Art. 1--With effect from the date of publication of the present Administrative Measure in the GAZZETTA UFFICIALE, the 5-lire (five-lire) surcharge on each kg of LPG, however produced or imported into Italy, previously set by CIP Administrative Measure No. 44/1977, is raised to 15 lire (fifteen lire).

Art. 2--The ocean transportation cost reimbursements to be effected with effect from 1 April 1981 will be subject to opinional estimates, to be requested of the LPG Transportation Adjustment Fund, as to the appropriateness of the freight cost.

The Adjustment Fund, should it find the freight cost inappropriate, will so notify the requesting firm within 48 hours; at the termination of this period, if the requesting firm has not received such notice, the freight cost will be understood to have been found appropriate.

In the computation of the 48 hours, Saturdays and holidays are excluded.

Art. 3--Considering the fact that the chief purpose of the Adjustment Fund is to encourage the direct flow of LPG to domestic consumers, quantities of LPG introduced into refineries for purposes of processing, semiprocessing or mixing are not reimbursable.

Art. 4--For the purpose of instituting an information system to provide all data useful for monitoring the payment of surcharges, the movements of production, and all other factors contributing to knowledge of the LPG market, the operators will report on a month-to-month basis to the Adjustment Fund the quantities of LPG on hand at the beginning of the month, of products (from insular and continental shelves and from inland underground sources) imported, channeled to processing, channeled to the consumer market, exported, and on hand at the end of the month.

[End of Decree 15/1981. Decree 17/1981 follows]

Administrative Measure No. 12/1981. Adjustment of methane-based gases distributed by means of urban networks. (GAZZETTA UFFICIALE No. 59 of 28 February 1981).

The Interministerial Price Committee [CIP]:

In view of Legislative Decrees No. 347 of 19 October 1944 and No. 363 of 23 April 1946, issued by the governing bodies in place;

In view of Legislative Decrees No. 283 of 22 April 1947 and 896 of 15 September 1947 issued by the Acting Head of State, and subsequent provisions;

In view of the CIPE [Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning] decree dated 20 September 1974 which, in subjecting methane to the "monitoring" system of the CIP, indicated the criteria to which prices must respond, preferably agreed with the organizations most representative of the users;

In view of the agreement stipulated on 6 September 1979 among the SNAM [National Gas Pipeline Company], the ANCI [National Association of Italian Municipalities], the FNAMEAV [expansion unknown], and the ANIG [expansion unknown] under the aegis of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, which provides for transferring to the price of methane 0.53 lire/m³ for every lira of increase in the price per kilogram of gasoil and, with effect from 1 October 1980, a further increase of 10.2 lire/m³ with the contextual transferring of the said increases to the tariffs, taking into account the loss factors;

In view of CIP Administrative Measures Nos. 52/1980 and 58/1980 of 30 September and 31 October 1980 respectively;

In view of CIP Administrative Measure No. 17/1980 of 30 April 1980 relative to the methodology for determining and revising the tariffs of gas distributed by means of urban networks;

Considering the national energy policy directives aimed at balancing prices among the various energy sources;

Having heard the views expressed by the Central Price Commission (Art. 2 of Legislative Decree No. 347 of 19 October 1944 issued by the governing body in place);

Decreases:

With effect from the delivery notes and billings, including partial ones, issued subsequent to the date of publication of the present Administrative Measure in the GAZZETTA UFFICIALE and with the application of the criterion established by the Ministry of Industry and Trade Administrative Measure No. 117 of 18 July 1947 regarding consumption priorities, consequent upon the increase in the price of natural gas to the distributing firms equal to a full 24,912 lire/m³, the equivalent of 2.738 lire/Mcal, added to the price resulting from the current contractual formula, authorization is hereby granted to add, for the account of the users, to all tariffs for methane-based gases distributed by means of the urban networks, this contextual increase.

Distributing firms are therefore authorized to apply increases to the current tariffs to the extent indicated below for the different manners of distribution, taking into account also the differences between gas introduced into the network and that billed in accordance with the provisions of point 1-a of CIP Administrative Measure 17/1980:

1) Methane-pipeline type of natural gas distributed as such or mixed, natural gas distributed by bottle-distributing vehicles:

$$(\text{lire/Mcal}) \frac{2.738}{C_{nc}}$$

where C_{nc} is the corrective coefficient for noncomputed gas that assumes the values stipulated in par. 1-a of Administrative Measure No. 17/1980;

2) manufactured gases for which different percentages of mixed and/or treated natural gas are used:

$$(\text{lire/Mcal}) w' \frac{2.738}{C_{nc}} + w'' \frac{2.738}{C_{nc} 0.75}$$

where w' = percentage of natural gas calories acquired and used in mixture, as shown in the most recently submitted request for tariff revision;

where w'' = percentage of natural gas calories acquired and subjected to thermal treatment, as shown by the most recent request.

To obtain the corresponding values in lire/m³ to those obtained from the above formulas, the latter must be multiplied by the highest calorific value standard for the gas distributed (in Mcal/m³).

Firms distributing methane gas by means of urban networks, are required to report to the CIP and to the CPP's [Provincial Price Committees] concerned, which will oversee the exact conformance with this Administrative Measure, the updated tariff values resulting from application of the present Measure, within 15 days from its publication in the GAZZETTA UFFICIALE.

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CSO: 3104/215

TRADE WITH ARAB COUNTRIES ANALYZED

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 3-9 Apr 81 p 8

[Text]

The Arab countries emerged as the most important buyers of Cyprus products last year, increasing their share of total Cyprus exports from 42 % in 1979 to 48.3 % in 1980.

The EEC countries occupied the second place in importance-taking 32 % of total exports as against 38.2 % in 1979.

Exports to Arab countries jumped from £70 m. to £82 m., according to the government's latest statistical report. They went mainly to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon, with smaller quantities going to Kuwait, Yemen, Iraq and Jordan.

Main exports during the year were clothing (worth nearly £26 m.), cement (£13.1 m.), potatoes (£12.7 m.) and footwear (£11.6 m.).

Imports from the Arab

world reached £53.4 m. or 12.6 % of the total compared with £29.6 m. in 1979.

Trade with EEC

Trade with EEC was strongly in favour of the European Community. While exports stood at around £50 m., imports amounted to £184.4 m. or 43.5 % of the total.

Exports to the UK, the island's main trading partner, dropped from about £41 m. to £36 m., while imports went up from £90.8 m. in 1979 to £95.5 m.

The largest trade surplus with an EEC country was with Italy-£45.8 m. worth of imports but only about £2.3 m. of Cyprus exports.

Imports from the Eastern Trading Area totalled £31.7 m. while exports rose slightly from £8.3 m. to £11 m.

The report shows that Cyprus had a trade deficit

last year of £236.2 million up 20.7 per cent over the previous year.

Imports increased by 18.8 % to £424.3 m. while total exports rose by 16.2 % to £188 m.

The report says Cyprus as always depends heavily on imports for her consumption, production and energy needs. As a result, higher oil prices and the sharp increase in import prices in general, were mainly responsible for the sizable rise in imports.

It says more than 50 % of the increase was brought about by oil imports which amounted to £78.5 million last year (up 78 %) and represented 18.6 % of the total.

The report confirms that the rate of growth of imports was slower during the last four months of the year "due to the credit squeeze and the reduced domestic economic activity".

MAJOR UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM APPEARS UNLIKELY

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 3-9 Apr 81 p 8

[Text]

Finance Minister Afxentis Afxentiou said this week he did not believe Cyprus faced the danger of a major unemployment problem in the near future.

He said the present level of unemployment of 2.5 per cent of the work force should not cause concern. The increase in the number of jobless from 2 to 2.5% had been only "very marginal".

Mr Afxentiou, who spoke about the tax revisions and concessions incorporated in a new Bill before the House, repeated his appeal to trade unions to show self-restraint in the submission of pay claims, in view of the tax relief measures offered by the government which will mean a loss of revenue of £8.5 m.

He stressed that any wage claims should be based on the rate of productivity growth.

The Finance Minister conceded that the competitiveness of the Cyprus exports has been affected as a result of high production costs.

"This is something we must all bear in mind. The

employers must increase productivity by organising their units better. Small units could merge to become more productive. This is why incentives are offered for mergers. Workers must confine their pay claims within the limits of the country's economic endurance. There is no economy in the world that can endure continuous pay rises that exceed the rate of productivity", he declared.

Interest rates

Mr Afxentiou also repeated his view that interest rates should be raised to enable a better management of the economy but said the relevant Bill amending the law was not expected to be approved by the present House.

Mr Afxentiou said despite the problems caused by the Turkish invasion, the Cyprus economy had "sound foundations".

He also said the government wished to attract foreign capital for investment in productive sectors such as manufacturing and tourism.

POST-FRANCO DETERIORATION OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Mar 81 p 32

[Article by Thierry Maliniak: "The Spanish Economy in Crisis"⁷

[Text] Officials of employers' organizations, labor union leaders, and politicians agree on at least one point, namely that the Spanish economy is in a serious slump. After the boom which began in the late 1960's and the end of which coincided with Franco's death, much to the detriment of his successors, the Spanish economy is currently in a stagnant condition. Like the rest of Western Europe, some will say, but the fact is that the economic crisis has affected Spain more severely because that country had only just begun its economic take-off and its economic base is still far from being as solidly established as that of its northern neighbors. Hence there is real reason for alarm and attention is inevitably being focused at the present time on emergency plans, labor-management pacts, and painful measures.

Unemployment is the most worrisome problem. By 1974, the last year of the boom, nearly a half million new jobs had been created. Since then, the number of available jobs has steadily declined. More than a million were lost during 1975 and 1979, and another 400,000 in 1980. The jobless rate had risen to 12 percent of the work force by the end of last year, and is expected to be above 12 percent at the end of this year, 14 percent, in fact, according to the Pastor Bank. These figures are of particular concern in that the work force represents only 32 percent of the total population, compared with an average of 38 percent in EEC countries.

Spain has 1.6 million unemployed workers, 400,000 of whom are in Madrid. Industrial centers are not free of this problem. According to a report by the local government's labor department, unemployment increased 25 percent in the three Basque provinces in 1980--including 48 percent in the province of Alava!--and affects some 120,000 persons. As acknowledged by Labor Minister Felix Manuel Perez in late 1980, one fourth of all unemployed Spanish workers are not covered by unemployment compensation.

The recession accounts for this phenomenon. The GNP rose by barely 0.8 percent in 1979 and by 0.5 to 1 percent--rate varies with the sources--in 1980. There is no indication that the situation will improve in 1981 because the level of private investment remains at rock-bottom. Gross capital formation has been negative for the past 5 years. Foreign investments increased only 6 percent--in real

terms--during 1980. This is not enough to make up for the absence of domestic savings. Furthermore, such investments render Spanish industry more dependent on foreign interests and also weigh heavily on Spain's foreign accounts. In 1980, the country showed a trade deficit of 15 billion dollars which resulted in a deficit balance on current account of 5 billion dollars, despite tourism and foreign currencies transferred to Spain by its emigrant workers.

Iron and Steel Industry

Illustrative of this economic slump is the iron and steel industry with its 45,000 employees. Because of the depressed economic situation, domestic demand for steel has been steadily declining, dropping from 12 million tons in 1947 to 8 million tons in 1979. To compensate for this, an effort was made to increase export sales. Spain which was exporting only 4.5 percent of its steel production in 1970 had increased its foreign sales tenfold by 1979. But the slump plaguing the entire European iron and steel industry, coupled with the protectionist reactions it triggered in EEC countries, has made export operations difficult. Especially as the Spanish steel industry is not very competitive: the value added per person in that sector is only 69 percent of the average value added in the steel industry of ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community] countries.

Because of competition, the Spanish steel industry was forced to sell at a low price with a small profit margin at a time when its costs were rising. The latter include wage costs--currently accounting for 30 percent of the cost price versus 20 percent of an average in EEC countries--and the constantly rising cost of energy. The sector became decapitalized and then indebted: financing charges represent 16 percent of sales. Nearing adoption is a reorganization plan in which industrial firms, labor unions, and banks will participate.

The overall picture in the automotive industry is the same. Some 13 percent fewer vehicles were bought in Spain between January and September 1980 than during the same period in 1979, already a bad year for the auto industry. All automobile manufacturers, except FASA (a Renault subsidiary), showed a drop in sales during 1980. The solution to the problem is greatly complicated by the fact that the sector consists principally of subsidiaries of foreign firms preoccupied primarily with employment in their home countries.

The situation is critical in the large SEAT [Spanish Passenger Car Company] plant, now that FIAT of Italy, formerly a majority partner, has refused to participate in two capital expansion programs. The Spanish Government has tried, unsuccessfully thus far, to interest the two "giants" of the Japanese auto industry, Toyota and Nissan, to purchase SEAT capital stock. In 1980, SEAT sold 200,000 vehicles on the domestic market and exported another 100,000, whereas it has an annual production capacity of 470,000 units. Only increased sales would enable the firm to regain its profitability. But current conditions appear to rule out any such increase on the domestic market. In October 1980, Ignacio Bayon, the minister of industry, acknowledged that SEAT had 10,000 superfluous employees.

The difficulties of the steel and auto industries are roughly similar to those besetting all industrial sectors. The country is paying the consequences of its progress in the fight against inflation. By resorting mainly to monetary type

measures, the government succeeded--its principal success--in curbing rising prices from a rate of 26.4 percent in 1972 to 15.1 percent in 1980. But reduced demand has limited domestic sales at a time when Spanish industry is not competitive enough on a European scale to expand its export sales to other European countries.

Carlos Ferrer, president of the CEOE (Spanish Confederation of Employer Organizations), the powerful employer "syndicate" grouping more than a million firms in all sectors, outlined for us his view of the economic slump: "The government implemented a monetary policy designed to control inflation, without leaving us any safety valves enabling the machinery of production to adapt itself to new conditions. Greater flexibility should have been allowed in employment matters, but the controlled economy thinking of the Franco era continued to prevail. Franco did not allow strikes, but on the other hand he did prohibit layoffs and dismissals. After Franco's death, strikes became widespread, but layoffs and dismissals were still prohibited."

In the face of worsening unemployment sorely pressing the syndicates and the government, employer groups did obtain, however, the flexibility they were seeking with adoption of the Workers Statute in 1979 and the basic employment law in 1980. This new legislation authorizes, inter alia, temporary and part-time labor contracts, and modifies the terms and conditions of layoffs and dismissals. Investments have continued, nevertheless, to stagnate, and unemployment to increase. These conditions have put the labor unions on the defensive. Marcelino Camacho, a senior leader of the largest labor organization, the Workers Commissions, closely linked to the PCE, told us: "This year, we do not expect to obtain any wage increases in real terms. We shall simply try to maintain purchasing power at its present level, and obtain a gradual reduction in the workweek. Priority must be given to the unemployment problem."

CEOE officials, however, point to increased wage costs and low profit margins as the reason for the "investment strike." Labor costs which in 1972 represented 56 percent of the total added value of Spanish firms, accounted for 71 percent of it in 1979. Inversely, during the same period, net profits (depreciation deducted) declined from 14.7 percent to 9.6 percent of that added value.

The CEOE argument is not unfounded. From Carlos Ferrer to the Spanish Communist Party's economist, Ramon Tamames, everyone agrees that there has definitely been a redistribution of income in the past decade. Between 1970 and 1974, wage earners' income represented on the average 58 percent of the national income. Between 1975 and 1979, the percentage rose to 60.5 percent. By 1978, wages increased more rapidly in Spain than in West European countries. Yet they have still not reached the average EEC wage level. In the new post-Franco political climate, Spain could not in any case continue--and this is the key to the present economic crisis--to have its international competitiveness depend exclusively on inordinately low wages.

The new wage costs are not the full explanation, however. Financing costs have also had their part to play: after the controlled interest rates of the Franco era, business firms were faced, as of 1977, with a liberalization of rates for which they were not prepared. Higher energy prices were also a factor, as were

likewise the 1977 fiscal reforms of Fernandez Ordonez, the finance minister at the time, reforms designed to make taxation more progressive.

Europe's Workshop

All of these factors aggravated Spanish industry's existing weaknesses namely its low productivity and limited technology. Although productivity has increased more rapidly than in neighboring countries, it is still low. In 1977, it was estimated to be 47.3 percent of the average productivity in EEC countries (compared with 40 percent 12 years earlier). Spain's limited technology is due to the absence of investments in that field. Desirous of going all-out and catching up with Western Europe, Spain chose to make massive purchases of foreign technology, hoping in this way to expedite the creation of new jobs. As a result, investment in technological research and development represents only half the sums spent in purchasing foreign "know-how," whereas such investment is five times greater in France and Germany. Says an embittered Spanish businessman: "We have become Europe's workshop."

Can the state be counted on to revitalize the economy in the face of the slump within the private sector? There is sharp disagreement on this issue between the CEOE's advocacy of restricting public investment to infrastructure spending, and the insistence of leftist political parties that the state must make up for the "indifference" of private capital. The public sector's growing deficit constitutes a strong argument in favor of the CEOE's position. Supporters of that position point to the danger of renewed inflation if there is any further increase in the budget deficit.

Actually, the problem is a complex one. The central government spends a great deal of money, but spends it inefficiently. Its revenues have doubled in the past 5 years, but they have been absorbed mainly by current expenditures. The latter have increased 125 percent while public investments have increased only 50 percent. To enable the public sector to revive the economy without fueling inflation, it will be necessary, first and foremost of all, to modify the distribution of expenditures and assign priority to those that are directly productive. Yet to do this, the central government would have to have a specific plan of action. As the PCE's economist, Ramon Tamames, explained: "The big problem is the total absence of any long-range economic forecasting and planning. The only major project currently planned is the construction of nuclear power plants. An economy cannot be efficiently managed when public investments themselves are not properly planned."

After having focused all of its attention on political change, Spain is now discovering that such change depends and will continue to depend on the resolution of economic problems. Spanish democracy, already endangered since the attempted coup of 23 February, would find it difficult to solidify itself on a foundation of bankrupt firms and sharply mounting unemployment. The present critical state of affairs should, in principle, make it easier to get the different social and political forces to agree on preserving the essentials and preventing democracy from collapsing, as was the case in 1977 with the Moncloa pact. Especially as entry into the EEC--now desired more than ever by Madrid as a means of removing the military specter--is liable to demand difficult reconversion of the Spanish economy.

ARCHBISHOP EXPRESSES PERSONAL POLITICAL VIEWS

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY In English 3-9 Apr 81 p 3

[Text]

Archbishop Chrysostomos has called on the squabbling political parties to stop their recriminations and feuding and pay more attention to ways of "freeing Cyprus from the Turkish aggressor".

Referring to the intense election campaign now going on, the Greek Cypriot primate said "We give the impression that we have forgotten that the enemy is here, holding our ancestral homes and posing a threat to the whole of the island".

In an interview with the Athens daily Kathimerini, the Archbishop strongly deplored the mud-throwing campaign among Greek Cypriot politicians and repeatedly called for unity and cooperation, hinting that the Church might undertake some initiative in this direction.

He urged everyone to put aside personal and party ambitions and join hands in one single party - the party of our struggling motherland.

Within the limits of its power, the Church is trying to do something in this direc-

tion reduce tensions, hatred and emotions and bring about a spirit of cooperation and concord" he said.

Archbishop Chrysostomos added: "As the spiritual leader of the people, we follow with deep concern and anxiety the sad situation at the home front. We must not forget that discord brought disaster to the Greeks at critical moments in their history".

Charging that Turkey wanted to take over the whole of Cyprus, the Archbishop declared that the intercommunal talks in their present form served Turkey's designs.

He said he was not against intercommunal negotiations but remarked: "As long as Turkey's invasion forces and 80,000 Turkish settlers are in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots cannot, even if they wanted agree to a settlement that would not serve Turkey's expansionist policy".

"What we should insist on with the United Nations is to arrange talks on the best way of implementing the UN resolutions on Cyprus which provide, from an international point of view, the best weapon in our hands", he added.

PRIME MINISTER SPEAKS IN FLORINA

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 19 Apr 61 p 24

[Article by K. A. Papageorgiou: "Kallias: 'We Are United and We Shall Achieve Victory'"]

[Text] Florina, 19 Apr (from our correspondent)--"PASOK will come to power in 2000," said Premier Kallias during a speech he delivered in Florina yesterday at 1400 hours.

"Let them," he added, "dream of power until election day when New Democracy [ND] will win with a majority which will reach 50 percent."

In a previous speech to the Kastoria Nomarchy Committee, Kallias stressed that ND remains united, setting aside egoism, differences and individualism--the traits of our people--because ND knows what the country's and its own interest is.

Chamber of Deputies Will be Informed

In Florina the premier responded to what Papandreu said Friday night [17 April] about the national issues, NATO and the [American] bases and said that the claim of PASOK's chairman that the Greek side is in a hurry to sign the agreement about the bases is wrong. "We have submitted to the Americans proposals which improve the conditions of operating the bases," he said. "When the Greek proposals are accepted and the relevant negotiations are completed, then will the agreement be signed."

At this point Kallias recalled that as a [cabinet] member in his father's [George Papandreu] government, A. Papandreu had consented to the operation of the American bases in Greece. He added that the Chamber of Deputies will be informed about the agreement regarding the bases and that there will be no secret protocols.

Referring to another Papandreu viewpoint that our participation in NATO does not guarantee Greece's border with Turkey, Kallias said that we belong to the Alliance for purely defensive purposes just as some of our neighbors belong to the Warsaw Pact. "As long as alliances exist, we shall remain in NATO because our defense is thus ensured," he said.

Greece Has No Designs

"Greece," he pointed out, "has no aggressive designs but it wishes to be secure on all sides. And thanks to the fighting condition of our Armed Forces we can avert any danger without provoking one."

"We do not ask anything from anyone. And we shall not concede any sovereign rights to anyone. All members of the government have distinguished themselves in our national struggles and no one can dispute this fact."

The Turks

Rallis then referred to Papandreou's view that the government wrongly negotiates with the Turks especially in view of the violations by Turkish planes last week of the Greek air space.

"The Turks," he said, "apologized for mistakenly violating our air space. The Greek Air Force also did its duty when it intercepted the Turkish planes in accordance with international regulations."

"Greece," he continued, "desires that international disputes be settled through peaceful procedures and as long as other countries also desire the same thing then there is no reason to take other measures. International practice provides us with the possibility of solving disputes by peaceful means. Neither the Greek people nor the Greek Government want to accept any reduction whatsoever of our sovereign rights."

Democracy Works

Rallis strongly rejected Papandreou's claim about a single party rule. He pointed out that democracy works well in Greece and that everyone enjoys freedom without any restrictions. He added that the press is free to judge and to criticize the government and many are the countries which are envious of Greece's democracy.

Rallis said that Papandreou's notion that university entrance examinations be eliminated would lead to a miserable professional proletariat. "If such a thing happened everybody would become a professional and other trades would not have enough manpower. So PASOK is sloganizing in this case, too," he said.

Mild Climate

Rallis stressed again the need to maintain a mild political climate and expressed the hope that PASOK will not disturb it again as it did recently. "But if PASOK does continue to do so," Rallis said, "the Greek people should force it into maintaining a mild political climate. All Greeks," he added, "regardless of political affiliation understand that without such a climate no democracy can exist."

ND Inty

At a dinner given in his honor late Friday night by the Kastoria News ND Committee, Rallis said:

"After K. Karamanlis left the premiership [to become president of the republic] many were those who claimed that the government would remain in power only 1 to 2 months and some had even called it 'a summer recess government.' But they were fooled once more. Our party is deeply rooted in the great majority of the people. Even though we were deprived of Karamanlis, a leader of Panhellenic and international renown, still we remained united and united we shall attain a victory greater than that of 1977. Our party will govern even after the next elections and will play a leading role in the country's political life."

Rallis urged all ND cadres and followers to start getting active as of today and expressed the confidence that such activation will contribute greatly to the ND electoral victory. He added that the Greek people, regardless of political affiliation, know very well that all achievements of recent years will be in vain if the country is not governed by ND--achievements the Greek people do not want to lose.

"We ourselves must explain to the people," he continued, "everything that has been accomplished in recent years. Our opponents do not have a specific program and whatever programs they present from time to time remind us of the movements of a weather vane. Under such conditions we can even reach the majority we received in 1974."

Electoral Contest

With regard to what Papandreou said about Rallis injecting the K. Karamanlis name into the election campaign, the premier made the following statement:

"In my speech in Kozani I asked the Greek people to help the present premier just as they did in the past when they helped the then Premier Karamanlis. I could have mentioned the names of other premiers and this would not have meant that I am injecting them into the electoral contest. Such would be the case if I had asked Karamanlis to participate in the present electoral struggle. But asking the people to give the same assistance they gave Karamanlis or Eleftherios Venizelos or Kharilaca Trikoupi does not mean that I involve them in the electoral contest. I simply ask the people to get involved in the electoral process and this is a mark of democracy. If the people don't get involved in the electoral process, I don't know who else would. I can't understand this particular syllogism."

Rallis spent the night in Florina and this morning will fly to Athens via Kozani.

7520

CBC: 4908/141

POLL PREDICTS CDA, LABOR LOSSES IN ELECTION

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 27 Apr 81 p 1

[Text] Hilversum, April 27--With a month to go to the May 26 elections, both the CDA and the Labour party are tipped to lose heavily, according to a survey carried out by the Nipo public opinion institute.

The results, processed by the Maurice de Hondt method, were published in the Red Cockerel radio programme of the Socialist Vara broadcasting corporation on Saturday.

It showed that, if elections were held now, the Christian Democratic CDA would lose 7 seats in the second chamber and drop to 42, while Labour would lose 9 seats and drop to 44.

The Liberal VVD, which had done badly in surveys since it joined the government, is making good its losses and would now only shed 2 seats to end up with 26.

The left-Liberal D'66 party would win 15 seats and get 23.

Youth Tips Scales

The Communists would get 4 seats (now 2) and the Pacifist Socialists 5 (now 1).

The two small Reformed parties would stay at 3 and 1 seats, respectively, the radical PPR party drop from 3 to 2, and the Farmers' and D'70 parties would lose the single seat they have each.

The survey was held among 2,281 respondents between April 6 and 13.

Mr de Hondt, analysing the figures, said the CDA was doing badly among the young voters, who are greatly attracted to the D'66 and Pacifist Socialist parties.

The VVD and Labour parties were gradually succeeding in restricting their losses to D'66, he said.

CSO: 3120

POLLING FIRM HEADS GIVE VIEWS ON LABOR PARTY VOTE CHANCE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 2 Apr 81 p 4

[Text] What chance does the Labor Party have going into the election? We took an opinion poll among our professional pollsters. Their answers are based on the February figures from the three institutes (polls taken in January).

"It is not our job to predict the future." The pollsters seldom miss an opportunity to point this out. But they do have opinions concerning what will determine the election results.

Reidar Haugenes, Norges Markedadata:

"I believe it will go down to the wire."

"These days anything is possible. Personally, I do not believe that the August polls will predict the election outcome with any great accuracy," said department head Reidar Haugenes of Norges Markedadata.

"One thing is certain: this election campaign is more important than any campaign before any previous election. All things considered, the Labor Party would benefit from a high turnout. This is true primarily because the Labor Party has more stay-at-home voters than any other party.

The campaign is important because many voters are changing loyalties and simple matters have sometimes had greater significance than ideologies.

What about the Labor Party's decline last fall?

"I think a kind of protest has been made against the status quo, an example of the conservative wave that can be found in all countries where the standard of living has been increasing for a long time. The Labor Party lost ground month after month from August to January. I believe that much of it can be explained by a variety of individual issues in the debate and the impression of a split in the party leadership. The voters have nothing against some dissent and debate within a party, but they lose confidence when the debate becomes an open battle."

"Which issues will have the greatest effect on the election outcome in the near future?"

"Economic policies, mainly. Inflation would have a negative effect on any party that happened to be in power."

"The economic policies will be decisive, perhaps security policy as well. The abortion issue will also come up in the campaign, but most people believe that it is no longer so important and that women should have the right to decide for themselves. One opinion poll also showed that the voters believe that the Conservative Party was correct in allowing its representatives to vote their conscience on this issue."

Bjorn Balstad, NOI:

"The Labor Party's position is poor. Even the increase we noted after the change in prime ministers gives the Labor Party a figure a good 5 percent lower than the last parliamentary election," Bjorn Balstad said. He is director of Norsk Opinions institutt A/S (NOI).

"It would not be impossible for them to win the election, but I would be impressed if they did. Based on the January figures, the Labor Party would have to gain 10 percent of the total electorate. That is a tough job. If they manage it, I will give them my obeisance."

"What factors in the near future will have an influence on the election results?"

"Five factors, in my opinion."

"Conservative Party, Christian People's Party, and Center Party voters have clearly stated that they want a government consisting of these parties. How the parties handle the coalition issue in the near future will certainly influence Labor Party support."

"The election campaign has become extremely important. Our post-election survey following the local elections showed that voters thought the Labor Party's campaign was much worse than the Conservative Party's. The election results reflect this."

"Thirdly, the issues. A number of controversial issues, some of which are controversial within the Labor Party as well, are up for discussion. The Alta affair is very troublesome and, regardless of the election outcome, it will be a burden for the ruling party. And inflation, of course, is an extremely dangerous phenomenon."

"The fourth factor is that the Labor Party must pick up undecided voters. The Labor Party has more to gain than any other party from the 'undecided' group."

"The fifth point is that they must make their policies known, convince various groups that they have something to offer them, and speak a language that people understand."

"Of what significance is the change in prime ministers?"

"The question is how long the change will remain of current interest. The fact that the new prime minister is a woman may be a more lasting advantage for the party."

"The Labor Party and the Conservative Party are competing, in part, for the same voters. The Conservative Party received the greatest benefit from the decline in Labor Party support. However, the changeover is not as great as both parties like to indicate."

Per Jacobsen, MMI:

"Can the Labor Party win the election? If I were for the Labor Party, I would answer yes. As a Conservative, I would answer no."

"I am anxious to find out myself," said Per Jacobsen, head of Markeds og Medialinstituttet A/S (MMI).

"The Labor Party is in the unfortunate situation in which about 25 percent of those who voted Labor Party in 1977 now answer 'undecided' or that they will vote for another party."

"In addition, the party lacks a grip on new voters. Our figures show further that voters in general are firmer in their position than voters who would prefer the Labor Party, if the election were held now."

"There are a striking number of voters who are still undecided. Trends within the 'undecided' group will have a strong impact on the outcome of the election."

"If the Labor Party can mobilize stay-at-home voters who voted for the party in 1977, it could increase its support by 4 percent of the electorate. It is easier to gain votes from one's own party than from other parties."

"What factors do you believe will determine the election outcome for the Labor Party?"

"I still believe people are most interested in the economic situation--employment, wages, taxes, and price rises. I believe that irritation in this area was greatly responsible for the party's decline last fall."

"People are interested in matters that concern them personally. The Alta affair, for example, is primarily a media event, not an issue that has created great interest among large groups of people."

"I also believe that the outcome of this national convention will have an effect on the party's support this fall. In addition, even the best election platform will be of little use if the policies are not made known. Whoever can best articulate his policies will score points this fall."

"What about the effect of Gro Harlem Brundtland?"

"So far we have noted little or not effect. Our first poll after the change in prime ministers showed surprisingly little change in the party's support. I cannot predict the future significance of the change in prime ministers, but I would not rule out the possibility of renewed enthusiasm among Party representatives."

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CSO: 3108/121

RED ELECTORAL ALLIANCE AGREES ON MORE MODERATE NATO PLANK

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Apr 81 p 7

[Article by Ottar Julsrud]

[Text] The Red Electoral Alliance sees as a major task the problem of providing Norway with a national defense strong enough to turn back a possible attack, as the platform states, by the most aggressive military power in the world--the Soviet Union. The national congress of the Red Electoral Alliance (RV) last weekend supported the withdrawal of Norway from the NATO allied command, but a general "Norway out of NATO" proposal was rejected. RV's newly elected leader, Fin Sjøe, explained to AFTENPOSTEN that Norway's withdrawal from NATO should occur gradually and with full consideration given to our security.

"Basing Norway's security on the weakest superpower, the United States, does not give us adequate security," said Sjøe, who is now succeeding Hilde Haugsgjerd as RV leader for the coming 2-year period. The national congress also favored including compulsory military service for women in their platform. A more cautious version supporting the right of women to undergo military training was not successful.

Standing forces in southern Norway, better training, and better local air defense are other main points of defense policy agreed upon at the Red Electoral Alliance's national congress. In a statement released by the congress, the government is roundly criticized for its lack of interest in civil defense. The RV demanded that oil revenues be used to create a decent defense.

Sjøe stated that the RV is prepared to fight for higher appropriations, if that should be necessary to achieve the desired level of defense. It would be possible, however, to save much of today's defense budget, especially by eliminating the F-16, Sjøe told AFTENPOSTEN.

Even though the 130 delegates who gathered at Linderud School in Oslo last weekend want to go all out for this fall's parliamentary election--election lists are being compiled in all districts--the long-term goal is still stated in the election platform, socialism will not be approved by parliament, it can only be achieved through revolution.

"What is the timeframe your group has in mind? When is the revolution coming?"

"At the present time, capitalism has existed in Norway for 500 years and we have no illusions that a revolutionary situation will arise in the near future. But the economic crisis in the world and the threat of war show that the situation can change. We are presently working patiently and thoroughly to point out the following reality: whether we have a socialist or nonsocialist government after the fall election is of no importance with respect to the interests of the working people," Finn Sjøe said.

A statement from the Red Electoral Alliance's national congress said that the government should immediately meet the Lapps' demand for their own elected assembly and that the Alta project should be stopped. The Lapps and their organizations can certainly not respect a decision by the Supreme Court, RV said. In another resolution, the Soviet Union was told to keep its hands off Poland and it was added that Norway must increase its vigilance with respect to the increasing tension there. The national congress also supported maintaining purchasing power at the 1979 level, holding oil production at 50 million tons per year, and outlawing Nazi organizations and similar activity.

In addition to officer Finn Sjøe and student Hilde Haugsgjerd, author Jon Michelet, actor Veslemøy Hamlund, and sociologist Tor Knutsen will exercise the daily leadership of the alliance in the future. They are part of a 16-member national board.

9336

CSO: 3108/121

PAPER COMMENTS ON RED ELECTORAL ALLIANCE CONGRESS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Apr 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Revolution's Child"]

[Text] It seems like a quirk of fate when the Marxist-Leninists are constantly in the forefront of the struggle to limit political activity in this country. With great pathos, the national congress of the Red Electoral Alliance advocated last weekend far-reaching legislature aimed at organizations that are "Nazi or fascist in nature." In the proposal, which they will attempt to have presented in parliament, membership in such organizations and the spreading of fascist ideologies or racist propaganda would be tantamount to terrorism.

We have previously stated that an especially sharp eye must be kept on the activity of certain shady groups. Racism, bomb throwing, and other illegal acts should be opposed in no uncertain terms and, basically, we have the legislature today to do that.

However, we continue to warn against arbitrary prohibitions against opinions. The term "of fascist nature" makes possible such broad interpretations that such a paragraph could easily be misused to cast suspicion on a number of political opponents.

"For a socialist Norway" is one of the main slogans in the election platform approved at the RV congress. It is pointed out that the type of socialism the electoral Alliance wants is not the type that could be approved by parliament. It can only be achieved through revolution and some day, through historical necessity, it will arrive. Then we will have a paradise on earth where, for example, nonsocialist, or social democratic for that matter, election victories would be impossible, since class distinctions, by definition, would be eliminated.

The expression "armed" revolution seems to have disappeared from the material that is to be distributed in the upcoming election campaign. The platform is devoted to the so-called struggle of the day and contains issues and ideas that in themselves do not differ greatly from those of some other parties. No one should doubt, however, that Soria Moria is looking to the future and whether they speak of work in parliament, infiltration into all manner of "popular fronts," or other activity--it is all directed toward one important future goal: to create what they call a revolutionary situation.

In their vision, it is not the children of the revolution who take up arms. They are merely forced to defend the revolution when the bourgeoisie attempts to destroy it. "History has taught us" that the bourgeoisie will always do this. One must be prepared.

We believe the Marxist-Leninists when they say that Eastern Europe should not be used as a model. We also believe them, however, when they promise in their confused writings to work for the hope and salvation of Norway--the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We repeat--it is ironic that this of all groups has assumed the task of protecting our democracy against the dangers of fascism.

9336

CSO: 3108/121

POLL SHOWS CHOICE OF BRUNDTLAND POPULAR WITH VOTERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Apr 81 p 3

[Text] The appointment of Gro Harlem Brundtland as prime minister was an extremely popular decision, a poll taken by Norges Markedsdata between 15 February and 10 March showed. Three-fourths of those questioned thought it was the best choice the Labor Party could make when Odvar Nordli had to resign and 68 percent thought it would give the party a victory in this fall's parliamentary election.

The first question Norges Markedsdata asked was: "Do you know who the prime minister of Norway is?" The results indicated that most people were aware of the appointment. All of 98 percent answered Gro Harlem Brundtland, 1 percent Nordli, and 1 percent did not know.

The next question was: "In early February, Gro Harlem Brundtland was appointed prime minister to succeed Odvar Nordli. To what extent do you believe this change in government could affect Labor Party support and the party's chance of winning the parliamentary election this fall?"

A total of 68 percent believed that the change in prime ministers would help the chances of the ruling party. Fourteen percent believed that it would help greatly, while 54 percent believed it would help some. Naturally enough, the optimism is greatest among the Labor Party's own voters, where 29 percent believed it would help greatly and 54 percent believed it would help some. Of all those questioned, only 3 percent believed that the change in prime ministers would cause a drop in Labor Party support.

Of all those questioned, 75 percent responded that Gro Harlem Brundtland was the best choice that the Labor Party could make when Odvar Nordli chose to resign as prime minister. The responses were as follows:

	All responses %	Of which	
		Men %	Women %
Brundtland best	75	72	78
Someone else better	11	14	7
Do not know	14	14	15

Among Labor Party voters, 87 percent thought that Brundtland was the best choice, while only 3 percent preferred someone else.

The choice of a female prime minister was also examined in the survey and the following question was asked: "Try now to disregard personalities and parties--what do you think of having a woman as prime minister? In your honest opinion, do you see it as positive, do you think it would be more appropriate to have a man in that position, or does it not matter whether a man or woman holds that office?"

The responses are given in the following table:

	All responses %	Of which	
		Men %	Women %
Woman positive	38	29	47
Man more appropriate	8	11	6
Does not matter	44	52	36
Do not know	10	8	11

When asked the following question, 54 percent replied "no significance:" "Do you believe that having a woman prime minister will make it easier in general for women to attain positions of leadership in this country, or do you believe that the appointment will be of no significance in this respect?"

A total of 37 percent answered that it would be easier, while 9 percent expressed no opinion.

Among responses from people over 60 years old, 48 percent thought that it would be easier for women in general to attain positions of leadership after the change in prime ministers.

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CSO: 3108/121

PCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM DOCUMENTS

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 19 Feb 81 (Supplement) pp 1-15

[Excerpts] Documents Approved at the Plenary Meeting of the PCP Central Committee of 13-14 February 1981

The PCP against the Balsemao government, for a democratic alternative

PCP conference on local government

On the constitutional revision

On problems of organization

On the PCP's 60th anniversary

The PCP against the Balsemao government, for a democratic alternative

1. Favorable changes in the political situation

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party, examining the evolution of the political situation, is of the opinion that, following the resounding defeat of the reactionaries in the presidential elections, the most imminent dangers have been averted and major steps have been taken in the defense and consolidation of the democratic regime.

The Central Committee is of the opinion that there has been a significant change in the national political situation that is unfavorable to the reactionary forces, and favorable to the democratic forces.

However, that change should neither be overestimated nor underestimated.

To overestimate the significance of that change would mean becoming lulled in the face of real dangers which still exist, creating the spurious notion that democracy has been definitively consolidated, dooming the workers and popular movement, and the democratic forces, to apathy and affording the reactionaries an opportunity to retrieve the offensive with equanimity.

To underestimate the significance of that change and of the new opportunities for struggle would mean dooming the workers and popular movement, and the democratic

forces in general, to discouragement and conformity, and would also lead to apathy or to the direction of the struggle with an erroneous perspective.

A correct evaluation must be made of the new situation created by the defeat of the reactionaries in the presidential elections. The strength of the enemy, the positions that it occupies, its current action and its future plans must be detected and taken into account. There must, simultaneously, be a full awareness of the immense strength of the workers and popular movement, of the new reality created by the revolution, which 5 years of counterrevolutionary offensive were incapable of destroying, and of the favorable evolution in the area of the institutions; and on that basis there must be concluded the existence of real opportunities for successfully opposing the reactionaries, for resisting the new offensives that the reactionaries are planning and for defending the democratic conquests and the regime established in the Constitution.

2. The Pinto Balsemao government a setback and a threat

1. Breakdown combat against the reactionaries and the AD [Democratic Alliance] government

The Central Committee established the main objectives and the major lines of the battle to be waged against the reactionaries in the near future.

1. The solution of the economic crisis on the basis of the democratic changes of the April revolution, the utilization and mobilization of the national resources and the active, creative participation of the workers.

2. The defense and improvement of the economic and social status of the workers and the middle classes and strata, wherein there are a great many problems involving wages, cost of living, unemployment, housing, health and education.

3. The defense and consolidation of the great conquests made by the April revolution, specifically regarding nationalizations and agrarian reform, as well as of the rights achieved by the workers, by the small farmers (owners and tenant farmers) and by other strata of the population.

4. The guarantee of the democratic standards and the end of the monopoly by the reactionaries over the nationalized news media; the defense of liberties against attempts to regulate them unconstitutionally made by the AD majority in the Assembly or by the AD government.

5. The derogation of the unconstitutional measures and actions of the previous governments, and the restoration of democratic legality (in several instances brought about by judicial decisions which have not been implemented up until now), specifically with the restitution in the MCRs and the cooperatives of the land, livestock, machinery, installations and other assets which were illegally taken from them, as well as with the restitution to the workers of various factories and business firms which were illegally usurped from them.

6. The guarantee that the Armed Forces, resisting governmentalization, partisanization and attempts at destabilization, will be kept in the service of democracy and national independence.

7. The defense of national independence, territorial integrity and the security of the Portuguese people, without subjugation to foreign interests, through a national foreign policy of friendship and cooperation with all peoples, and the refusal to allow Portugal to become a dependency of the multinationals and a base for nuclear arms and imperialist aggression.

8. The defense of the institutions, Authority and democratic operation of the organs of sovereignty, and of the autonomy of the local government.

9. The defense of the Constitution and steadfast opposition to any attempts at an unconstitutional revision aimed at destroying the regime and causing upsets in the correlation of forces and in the political situation at the present time.

The AD government no longer has an electoral, social and political base that would legitimize its continuation. The dismissal of the government has a legitimate place in the operation of the institutions and in democratic legality.

There are many outlets and solutions to this problem. The government could resign because it is lacking in parliamentary support at present. It could be forced to resign through the passage of motions for censure or through the non-passage of a motion for confidence. It would be dismissed by the president of the republic.

The Central Committee stresses that an objective of prime importance for the democratic forces is to overthrow the AD government, evict it from power and put in the government genuine democrats, in the service of the people and the country.

The Central Committee also emphasizes that the present AD majority in the Assembly of the Republic (as a result of the antidemocratic conditions created by the Sa Carneiro/Freitas do Amaral government for holding the elections of 5 October and because of the defeat suffered by AD on 7 December) does not represent either the option or the will of the Portuguese people.

The AD does not have social, political or electoral support that would legitimize its having a majority in the Assembly of the Republic and forming a government. The defense of democracy and legality requires that this anomalous situation be corrected.

The Central Committee stresses now that the evolution of the political situation may make it necessary, in the more or less near future (but in any case far earlier than 4 years after the elections of 5 October 1980), to hold new elections for the Assembly of the Republic.

4. Democratic alternative with the unity and struggle of democrats

The Central Committee points out that a democratic shift, a democratic alternative, is possible within the framework of the institutions and the current correlation of political forces, based on an understanding among the various democratic forces.

The relative weight of the political forces indicates that no party of itself can establish a government.

The Central Committee once again cautions against the deception involved in the persistence of the PS [Socialist Party] (and the FRS [Socialist Republican Front]) in attempting to become established as "the only possible alternative," when the experience throughout the years has proven and the 1980 legislative elections showed that the PS (and FRS) alone is not in any position to attain a majority.

All experience has proven the speciousness of the claim of those who, prompted by anti-communism, put forth the idea that a democratic alternative can take place without the PCP.

The Central Committee gives a reminder that, based on what experience has proven, the alternatives to a policy of unity with the PCP are reactionary governments, or governments of PS alliances with the reactionaries.

A democratic alternative and the formation of a democratic government are possible only with the PCP.

The Central Committee confirms the fact that the serious crisis besetting the PS reveals, among other differences, the clash of two movements: one (reinforced by the backing for Eanes' candidacy and by his victory) which is acquiring a growing awareness of the need for joint action by the democrats for the defense of the regime; and another (led by Mario Soares and fostered by the reactionary forces) which stresses a search for PS alliances with the AD or with parties comprising it (as indicated by the recent shameful PS/PSD [Social Democratic Party] agreement in the DIT [General Union of Workers]). If this movement were to be victorious, the PS would head toward backing the Balsemão government, toward an understanding with the right, toward the unconstitutional revision of the Constitution and toward the so-called "central bloc," in other words, toward a collapse as a socialist party on the Portuguese political scene.

As for leftism, the Central Committee points out that the resounding defeat of Otelo and the UDP [Popular Democratic Union] in the 1980 presidential elections once again confirms its impotence and its negative role. Leftism, with its divisive, anti-PCP, pseudo-revolutionary, extremist and often provoking action, has been and continues to be a tool of the reactionary policy.

Leftism will still attempt new formulas, new organizations, new initials and new names (such as what is now called the "New left"); it will attempt new divisive maneuvers in labor union existence, with what it now terms "revolutionary labor unions." But it is obviously deteriorating. Leftism has no future in Portuguese democracy.

While at the same time stressing the continuation of the battle against leftism, the Central Committee underscores the need to win over for the cause of unity those who dissociate themselves from leftist influences and illusions.

The Central Committee deliberated again on the lessons of the mass movement, and the movement of unionism and of joint or convergent action by democrats of the most varied persuasions, which led to the defeat of the AD candidate, Gen Soares Carneiro, and to the victory of Gen Rangel Eanes on 7 December.

The Central Committee is of the opinion that the facts continue to prove the correctness of the proposition that the presidential elections attested to the existence of "an extremely vast social and political area of potential backing for a democratic shift and a democratic policy."

The Central Committee stresses the importance of the Independents (democrats without a party affiliation from the most varied political movements: socialists, social democrats, progressives, liberals and antifascists of various kinds) in national political life.

The Central Committee also takes note of a significant move by major Catholic sectors, including organized movements and priests, to the camp of democracy, social justice and defense of the constitutional regime.

The Central Committee stresses the PCP's determination to continue its struggle for democratic unity, both in the relations among parties and beyond the scope of agreements and understandings among parties, for which there are vast opportunities.

The struggle for unity is inseparable from the struggle against divisionism: against the divisionists who attempt to prevent rapprochement and understanding among democratic parties (of which the activities of the leftist groups and of anti-communist elements in the PS are examples); against labor union divisionism, the most recent reflection of which, the I&T Congress (a shameful tool of big management and imperialism) resulted in failure; and against the electoral divisionism which only the reactionaries use to their advantage.

In accordance with its unifying policy, the Central Committee has decided:

1. To continue and intensify the cooperation with the MDP (Portuguese Democratic Movement), a direct ally in the United People's Alliance (APU).
2. To reactivate and intensify the regular contacts and connections with the PS on all levels wherever they appear possible.
3. To resume regular formal and informal contacts with other democratic political forces and their groups.
4. To establish an exclusive consultation with the most variegated independent sectors, with a view toward exploring the possibilities of new forms of unifying, democratic organization and action.
5. To multiply the efforts for unifying action in all the social sectors and in the mass organizations and movements.

14 February 1981

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party

PCP conference on local government

3. Within the context of the APV, the PCP has been assuming great and increasing responsibility with respect to local government. During the entire period following 25 April, and particularly since the first elections for the local government organs, the PCP has made a decisive contribution, both to the institutionalization of local government and through its participation in the local government organs, contributing to the solution of countless problems of the populations.

These responsibilities became greater after the most recent elections for the local government organs, wherein the APV received a majority in 50 municipalities and 310 parishes, in addition to being represented, although as a minority, but with an opportunity for performing important work, in nearly all the municipal councils on the continent and in a sizable number of municipal councils of the autonomous regions.

It is the express goal of the present government not only to accentuate that policy but also to reduce the people's participation and to seriously affect the elective nature of the main organs of local power.

Under these conditions, it has become necessary to pursue and intensify the struggle for reinforcement of local power, specifically through the total application of the laws on local finances and of the powers and authority of the local governments, and through the passage of the bill to demarcate authority in the area of investments that was voted for unanimously by the previous Assembly of the Republic.

5. In these terms, taking into account the need for improving our work and for reinforcing the local government, in opposition to the reactionary plans to restrict its democratic quality, functions and resources, the PCP Central Committee has decided to convoke a PCP Conference on Local Government, to be held in the Almada municipal council, on 21 June 1981.

6. The conference will be required to render an account of the work already done for the benefit of the populations, carry out an exchange and dissemination of the experience gained in the various situations in which the party has acted in the local governments, and make a thorough analysis of all the main issues that the local governments must address.

7. The conference will be required to act in plenary session during the morning, in sections based on topics in the afternoon and in plenary session for closing at night. The entire conference will be open to the public and to the news media.

8. The PCP Central Committee recommends to the party's militants and organizations an active involvement in the preparatory work for the conference, so that, in accordance with the PCP's style of collective study and work, the holding of the conference will culminate in an extensive, open, democratic debate.

The Central Committee recommends that, just as in the case of previous actions and experiences, the preparatory work for this conference be open to democrats who express an interest in participating in this endeavor, even though they may not be party militants. This participation by non-party members should also be allowed extensive expression in the conference sections themselves.

14 February 1981.

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party.

On the constitutional revision

1.

The PCP totally rejects any idea of a total revision, and is striving to have the revision confined to what is necessary. The PCP Central Committee warns against the proposals made by the AD for unconstitutional changes, with the intention of weakening the regime and its institutions, and preparing for its subsequent elimination.

The Central Committee stresses that, if the revision of the Constitution is to be legal and legitimate, it must strictly observe the material and formal limits established by the Constitution itself in Articles 286 and 290; specifically, the requirements for two thirds of the deputies' votes and the impossibility of revising certain provisions, such as those establishing the rights and guarantees of the citizens, the rights of workers, the principle of the collective appropriation of the principal means of production and land, the elimination of the monopolies and large estates, economic planning, the system of proportional representation, the separation and interdependence of the organs of sovereignty, the autonomy of the local governments, and the political-administrative autonomy of the autonomous regions.

Any change in the Constitution which failed to observe these limits would be illegal and illegitimate, and would assume a subversive nature.

The Assembly of the Republic elected on 3 October has the authority for a constitutional revision, but it does not have powers to subvert the Constitution, or to alter the limits on revision established in the Constitution itself.

Constitutionally, the revision is a right and not an obligation given to the present Assembly of the Republic.

The AD does not have the two-thirds majority in the Assembly of the Republic that is necessary for approval of any change in the Constitution. Therefore, the approval by the Assembly of the Republic of any unconstitutional changes will be impossible if the PS says no to the AD's attempts to induce it to the consensus that would make possible the attacks which the reactionary forces want to unleash against the fundamental law.

The battle in defense of the Constitution must not be limited to the Assembly of the Republic, the parliamentary groups and the party leaderships. All democrats and patriots, and the entire Portuguese people, have a major role to play, by voicing their opinion and striving steadfastly to guarantee that the revision of the Constitution will not become another destabilizing and subversive act.

The constitutional revision is part of the political battle at the present time, and has been used by various political forces to address current problems and to facilitate the attainment of their short and medium-term goals.

Thus, the plans and ideas put forth by the AD are naturally aimed at progressing and laying the groundwork for the revision, attempting to give the impression of an atmosphere of consensus in favor of its plan for an unconstitutional revision of the Constitution; but they are also intended, equally and immediately, to afford protection for violations of the Constitution and for a de facto revision.

For example, Freitas de Amaral's proposal that the president of the republic not be allowed to dismiss a government that has majority backing in the Assembly of the Republic, or making the exercise of the president's authority to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic contingent on an organ with hostile membership, is obviously aimed at creating legal instruments for relaunching the offensive against the president, depriving him of opportunities for effective intervention against new subversive plans of the reactionary forces, and perpetuating the AD government, regardless of its action and the opposition to its policy.

The reactionary forces have been carrying out their plans for elimination of the democratic regime and subversion of the Constitution of the Republic in many directions.

First, with the cooperation and protection of the PS leadership, they promoted the legislative counterrevolution, aimed at opposing through common law the democratic regulations and requirements established in the fundamental law.

Second, having won the majority in the Assembly of the Republic and the government, they attempted to create an actual unconstitutional situation, completely disregarding and disdaining the Constitution of the Republic; they implemented an illegal, anticonstitutional and antidemocratic policy aimed at destroying the fundamental law; and they engaged in an institutional guerrilla action directed, over the short term, at subverting the democratic regime and institutions.

Third, they planned the attack on the presidency of the republic and the unconstitutional elimination of the Council of the Revolution so that, based on a monopoly on the organs of power and by way of the unconstitutional referendum and pressure and blackmail imposed on the PS and other political forces, they might foster the complete destruction of the Constitution of the Republic and the democratic regime.

The defeat of the AD and of its candidate in the 7 December elections suddenly blocked the path of the reactionaries, resulting in defeating their subversive plan. But the right, represented essentially by the PSD and CDS (Social Democratic Center Party), did not desist from its goals and, although defeated, it has persisted in its intentions which, under the guise of reviewing the Constitution, are actually aimed at subverting it and replacing it with a new Constitution opposed to the republic and opposed to Portuguese democracy.

With the excuse of removing the alleged "ideological burden" from the Constitution, they are attempting to eliminate from it all the barriers against the restoration of the economic and political power of the monopolists and large estate holders, specifically by eliminating all references to socialism as an objective, deleting all obstacles to the reestablishment of the monopolies and the large estate system, and excluding the rights of the workers and their organizations from the material limits of the revision, deconstitutionalizing them, and expressly accepting their curtailment by way of legislation, or by introducing constitutional limitations on them henceforth, as in the case of the right to strike.

Falsely invoking democracy, "complete and without restraint," they maintain the objective, through a duly tamed military hierarchy, of turning the Armed Forces into a tool for the elimination of the Regime, subordinating them again to the narrow, class interests of big capital and the large estate holders, against the national interests and those of the Portuguese people.

Attempting to remove its material limits on the revision, their immediate aim is to reduce the force and the scope of the most important terms of the Constitution, and to plan the possibility of an attack of a "twofold revision" type.

Seeking, even against the will of the majority of the people expressed in elections, to insure the perpetuation of the AD in the government and its control in the Assembly of the Republic, they are attempting to limit the powers of the president of the republic, and to contrive unjust electoral laws that would give it a majority of deputies even with a great loss of votes.

In order to destroy the democratic and pluralistic local government, they are attempting to put the municipal executives entirely at the disposal of any political boss maneuver or fortuitous majorities, either by proposing their indirect election or by eliminating the proportional representation.

By trying to deconstitutionalize certain important guarantees and principles relating to the liberties and rights of the citizens, and their participation in political activity, they intend to create the conditions for stifling and annihilating the democratic forces and to prepare for the restoration of the power of big capital (associated with imperialism) and of the large estate holders, and for the establishment of a new dictatorship.

The PCP is steadfastly opposed to all these maneuvers of the AD and all the reactionary forces, and will intransigently defend the Constitution of the Republic, the democratic regime and the revolutionary changes achieved by the Portuguese people after 25 April.

11.

The PCP Central Committee deems it fitting to put forth some ideas concerning the proposals for revision to be submitted by the PCP's Parliamentary Group, at the appropriate time, to the Assembly of the Republic, as well as to express, at present, its opposition to the proposals coming from other political areas, which cannot fail to evoke immediate repudiation.

Indeed, as the Preamble of the Constitution is considered, the PCP Central Committee does not think that it should be changed (or eliminated). Since it is not part of the text of the Constitution, and as a kind of historic record (or "birth certificate") of the Constitution, it would not make any sense to change it.

As for the Fundamental Principles, the PCP will not take the initiative to propose any changes.

Agreeing that certain provisions may be subject to improvement, the PCP will oppose any changes which distort the substance of the fundamental principles, or which are

intended to introduce into the Constitution highly questionable elements (for example, such as the establishment of "jus sanguinis" [blood relationship] as an exclusive criterion for granting citizenship, or an explicit provision for membership in the EEC).

In the realm of fundamental rights, the PCP will submit some proposals for change, aimed at: a. limiting the legislative discretionality in the creation of obligations for citizens; b. expressly providing for the protection of the right to civil status and to citizenship; c. reinforcing the guarantees of law and penal process, and of limitation on the legislative liberty in the area of the creation of penalties and security measures; d. reinforcing the right of action, expanding the areas wherein all citizens may bring before the courts the defense of collective interests; e. reinforcing the guarantees of independence and pluralism in the state news media; f. conferring on the structure of fundamental rights the provisions that are now established only as obligations of the state (as in the case of the defense of the cultural patrimony, etc.)

Admitting, of course, the possibility of other improvements, the PCP will, however, oppose any proposal aimed at reducing the guarantees of fundamental rights, including the rights of workers and their organizations (specifically, the right to strike, labor union liberty and the right of union associations and Workers Commissions, control of management), whether by making them unconstitutional, by introducing a general clause allowing their curtailment by way of legislation or by downgrading them through a transfer to other areas of the Constitution.

With respect to economic organization, the PCP will not take the initiative to propose any changes either.

Without precluding the possibility of improving some of its provisions without detriment to its essential content, the PCP will still oppose all the proposals aimed at upsetting the substantial elements of the economic constitution, specifically, the guarantee of the nationalizations and of agrarian reform, economic planning and the characterization of the various sectors of the means of production.

As for the organization of political power, the PCP's proposals for revision will be guided by two fundamental objectives: a. improvement of the mixed government system, with the government's simultaneous dependence on the president of the republic and the Assembly of the Republic, with the maintenance of the powers of the president of the republic, but with a reinforcement of the powers of the Assembly of the Republic vis-a-vis the government; b. in the event of the abolishment of the Council of the Revolution, maintenance of the institutionalization of the objective role of the military in national political activity, while at the same time preventing the governmentalization and, through the latter, the partisanization of the Armed Forces.

Thus, insofar as the president of the republic is concerned, the changes proposed by the PCP will be directed exclusively toward filling gaps in the constitutional text concerning certain powers stipulated in the law which should be constitutionalized (such as the authority to set the date of the presidential and regional elections and to appoint the chiefs in the Armed Forces hierarchy, and the functions related to honorary orders).

In the event that the Council of the Revolution is abolished, a solution will have to be found for certain powers of the president of the republic which are currently subject to authorization from the Council of the Revolution, and which would cease to be in the same terms. While accepting the possibility of adjustments resulting from the change of status of other organs of sovereignty, the PCP will still oppose any change which entails a reduction in the powers of the president of the republic.

Insofar as the Council of the Revolution is concerned, the PCP will not take the initiative to propose its abolishment.

But, in anticipation of that hypothesis, it is important to put forth the counter-proposals now, to be submitted at the proper time. The PCP will oppose any solution which, based on the abolishment of the Council of the Revolution, and using as an excuse a vitiated concept of the principle of "subordination of the military authority to the civilian authority," entails a substantial change in the present balance between the various organs of sovereignty, or which would lead to governmental disunity of the political and administrative management of the Armed Forces, making them dependent on the changes in the political situation and the government at all times; or which would not provide the necessary institutionalization of the Armed Forces' commitment to the Democratic regime resulting from 25 April.

Therefore, in the event of the abolishment of the Council of the Revolution, its functions will have to be given to other organs which exist or are to be created, so as to attain the aforementioned goals, with the necessary adjustments.

For example, the functions of overseeing constitutionality would have to be transferred to a constitutional court to be created, which would also take in the present Constitutional Commission.

The legislative functions involving fundamental standards in the military area would be kept under the exclusive authority (which would become impossible to delegate) of the Assembly of the Republic.

The functions involving regulation and administration of the Armed Forces would be incumbent on a new organ to be created, with an appropriate name, presided over by the president of the republic, which would have to include, among others, the CEMGFA (Armed Forces Chief of Staff) and the CEMs [Chiefs of Staff].

The functions involving consultation and contingency of the acts of the president of the republic would also be assigned to a new organ to be created, in conjunction with the president of the republic, with a suitable name, established not as a new organ of sovereignty, but rather as an organ "adjoining" the president of the republic. Its authority would be of an essentially consultative and not deliberative nature, and its membership would have to conform to its nature (specifically avoiding making it an organ of confrontation for the organs of sovereignty or their heads).

The PCP is of the opinion that the defense and the continuity of the democratic regime will be reinforced by the presence of April military in the organs which are created, in the event of the abolishment of the Council of the Revolution, to provide for functions that the latter currently has.

Insofar as the Assembly of the Republic is concerned, the PCP will propose two types of changes: on the one hand, to give substance to the idea of the permanent existence of the Assembly of the Republic, even when it is not in session, as well as to put it under the protection of the majority rule at all times; and, on the other hand, to reinforce its position with respect to the government, both in the area of supervision and in the legislative area.

Thus, with regard to the first point, it will propose: a. that the Assembly of the Republic always be elected for 4 years, even in the case of elections for dissolution, therefore ceasing to hold interim elections; b. that the term of the deputies be regulated in such a way that there will be no solutions of continuity in the popular representation and, hence, in the existence of the Assembly of the Republic; c. that the operation of the Assembly of the Republic not be allowed to be halted except by a qualified majority, and that it may not be in operation less than a certain number of months or for a certain number of meetings per year.

In the area of reinforcement of the powers of the Assembly of the Republic, the PCP will propose, with regard to supervision: a. that the parliamentary inquiries may be compulsory, regardless of the vote in the Assembly of the Republic, provided they are demanded by a sizable number of deputies (or parliamentary groups), and relate to the conduct of the government or the administration that may involve a crime of responsibility (for example, corruption, etc.); b. that the ministers are compelled to appear periodically before the Assembly of the Republic to answer questions from the deputies.

With respect to the reinforcement of the legislative powers, the PCP will propose: a. a demarcation of an area of absolute legislative privacy for the Assembly of the Republic, which may not be delegated to the government (apart from that currently stipulated in Article 154), covering, among others, the following areas: citizenship, civil status and capacity of individuals, martial law and state of emergency, determination of crimes, penalties and measures related to security, and general bases of the penal process, electoral laws, political parties, organization of national defense and duties stemming therefrom; b. extension of the areas of privacy related to Article 167, to include matters on which the government currently legislates freely (for example, social security); c. contingency of the legislative authorizations, requiring the laws on authorization to contain the general principles of the matters delegated to the government; clarification of the type of ratification for decree-laws, abolishing the so-called "tacit ratification;" e. affirmation of the principle of supremacy of the laws of the Assembly of the Republic over decree-laws, with the latter allowed to repeal the former only when expressly authorized.

Admitting, to be sure, the possibility of other improvements, it will, however, oppose intransigently any proposal that would entail a downgrading of the status of the Assembly of the Republic.

As for the government, in addition to the changes stemming from the proposals relating to the Assembly of the Republic, the PCP will propose some improvements in detail: a. to consider the passage of a motion for censure sufficient to bring about the dismissal of the government, provided it has been passed by an absolute majority; b. demarcating the authority of the dismissed governments (through a discharge of the prime minister or through parliamentary vote), prohibiting them

from acts of political innovation, "ministerial testaments" or other similar types; c. requiring the passage of all decree-laws in the Council of Ministers, so as to hold all of them responsible for the government legislation; d. strictly determining the type of government action, to preclude the misuse of its regulatory powers.

Without excluding the acceptability of other improvements, the PCP will, however, oppose all proposals aimed at making a substantial change in the government system that would result in the governmentalization of the regime through the reinforcement of its status with respect to either the president of the republic or the Assembly of the Republic.

With respect to the courts, the PCP deems the following changes necessary: a. a reference to the status of the judges of the non-judicial courts, which is currently not stipulated, unjustifiably, in the Constitution; b. clarification of the scope of authority of the military courts, limiting it to the military criminal forum; c. acceptability of non-jurisdictional organs of authority in conflicts in certain areas.

Without excluding other improvements, the PCP will oppose the elimination of the category of elected, non-magistrate judges and other forms of the people's participation in the administration of justice.

As for the autonomous regions, the PCP considers the following changes to be necessary: a. determining more clearly the authority of the autonomous regions, especially in legislative matters (definition of the areas of specific regional interest), and in economic and financial matters; b. transferring to the organ monitoring constitutionality the authority that is now legally given to the Supreme Administrative Court to settle conflicts between regional regulations and regulations emanating from the republic's organs of sovereignty.

While accepting other improvements, the PCP will still oppose any proposal aimed at challenging or discrediting regional autonomy, whether it be in a restrictive sense or a federalist sense.

Insofar as the local government is concerned, the PCP considers the following changes to be necessary: a. eliminating the unwarranted interference of the central government in the functioning of the local governments, made possible by the dependence marking their current general situation; b. revising the provisional system of district administration, specifically by creating an executive organ, to be elected by the District Assembly, and turning over to the civil governor, exclusively, the functions of representative of the central government, through the abolishment of the powers that it currently has relating to the district local government organs.

Without excluding the possibility of other changes, the PCP will steadfastly oppose any change aimed, directed or indirectly (for example, by way of deconstitutionalization) reducing the guarantees of autonomy and democratic quality of the local government, changing the system for election of the respective organs, abolishing or curtailing the people's direct participation in the respective administration, or paving the way for discrimination or other criteria caused by illegitimate interests in the area of institutionalization of the administrative regions.

As for public administration, the PCP considers two changes to be necessary: a. reinforcement of the citizens' guarantees against illegal acts, increasing the opportunities for an appeal to the courts; b. reinforcement of the guarantees against the governmentalization and partisanization of public administration, banning discretionary action in the recruitment of personnel.

In these areas, the PCP will oppose any proposals aimed at reducing the guarantees of the administration's legality, or curtailing the rights of the workers in public administration.

Insofar as the Armed Forces (Title X) are concerned, the PCP will not take the initiative to propose any changes and, without precluding the possibility of improvement, will oppose any proposal aimed at governmentalizing the Armed Forces leadership, or downgrading their national character.

With regard to supervision of constitutionality, the PCP considers the following changes to be warranted: a. improvement in the system of preventive monitoring, specifically allowing it to apply not only to legal documents but to regulations as well; b. improvement in the monitoring of unconstitutionality by omission, allowing it to be requested by the entities themselves, and limiting it to the verification of the existence of the omission by the organ monitoring the constitutionality; c. expanding the number of entities which can request abstract monitoring of unconstitutionality (for example, to include the parliamentary groups).

Apart from the possibility of considering other changes in detail, the PCP will still oppose any change aimed at making a substantial modification in the present system, whether by eliminating the preventive monitoring or the monitoring of unconstitutionality by omission, or by concentrating the functions of monitoring constitutionality in one organ exclusively, removing it from the courts in general.

In the event that the Council of the Revolution is abolished, the PCP will propose the creation of a Constitutional Court to discharge the duties currently assigned to the Council of the Revolution and the Constitutional Commission, with the changes proposed previously. This organ must have a membership geared to its specific nature, which will offer guarantees that it will not be subject to a viewpoint not in keeping with the Constitution.

As for the chapter on the constitutional revision, the PCP will not propose any change and will reject any proposal aimed at weakening the guarantee of the Constitution, whether by reducing the qualified majority necessary for revisions, by abolishing or weakening the material limits, or by introducing the referendum on revision as a means of shaping the formal and material limits.

As for the temporary provisions, the already obsolete provisions can obviously be eliminated, but the PCP will oppose the elimination of other final provisions which are not only not yet obsolete, but also are not at all temporary in nature.

14 February 1981.

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party.

On problems of organization

I. The Central Committee examined the most pressing problems that are posed in the reinforcement of the party's organization.

Calling attention to the importance of organization as a fundamental weapon for successfully coping with the complex party tasks confronting our party, the Central Committee notes, at the same time, that the development of the organization is closely linked to the activity of the organizations in the defense of the interests of the people and the country.

II. The last evaluation of organization shows that, during 1980, the party's ranks underwent a great increment, greater than those achieved in either of the two preceding years. However, the prospects for the party's enlargement still exist; it is possible to continue the recruitment in all regions.

The number of party entities also increased significantly last year; but the structuring of the organization has not kept pace with the expansion of the number of party members. The company cells, in particular, have not had a development in keeping with the evolution of the party's influence.

The percentage of comrades with regular activity in a party organization is now larger than it was a year ago. But, in absolute figures, the number of comrades lacking any contact with the organization rose.

Shortcomings of an ideological nature, in work style and structuring and of other types are preventing a greater expansion and strengthening of the organization, a more steady expansion of the party's influence and a more intense and diversified activity increasingly associated with the working and popular masses.

III. The year 1981, year of the party's 60th anniversary, must be a year of struggle against the main weaknesses in organization.

In this connection, the Central Committee resolves that a major organizational campaign be carried out in all the organizations throughout this entire year, dealing with the following matters in particular:

1. To contact all the party's comrades regularly

1.1. To make contact with all the comrades who are currently dissociated in order to bring them back into the party's regular activity. It is necessary for every party member to participate in one of its organizations.

1.2. Through those contacts, to resolve the various questions related to the updating of membership cards and the transmittal and delivery of the cards to party members. It is necessary for all the cards to be delivered rapidly.

1.3. To persuade all the comrades of the significance and necessity of paying dues, and to attempt to update the amount thereof. It is necessary for all party members, according to the statutes, to meet their obligation to pay regular dues.

1.4. To give far greater publicity to the party's central organ, AVANTE, and to the organization bulletin, O MILITANTE, and to promote the reading thereof, not only to help raise the ideological and political level of the militants, but also to carry the party's voice to its militants, and to the workers as a whole. It is necessary to increase greatly the dissemination of AVANTE and O MILITANTE.

1.5. To structure the organization far more thoroughly

1.5.1. To direct that structuring primarily toward the cells in the major companies, which must have a full-time capable of guaranteeing their regular and efficient operation;

It is necessary to restructure the large cells in order to make a substantial improvement in their activity;

1.5.2. To create cells in all the large and medium-sized companies, and in the companies as a whole. It is necessary that there be a party cell to take action at least in all companies with over 100 workers, and in other major companies on the regional scale;

1.5.3. To reinforce the Municipal Commissions in existence, so as to make them active, responsible entities capable of structuring the respective organizations, directing their activity and addressing the political problems of the municipalities. It is necessary to strengthen the Municipal Organizations, in order to intensify and expand their activity;

1.5.4. To create Municipal commissions where they do not yet exist, as well as more Party Commissions. It is necessary that there be a party organization and the respective Municipal Commission in all the municipalities;

1.6. To improve the political operation of the party organizations, and to combat work, control and management work. To encourage in all levels the capacity for decision-making, the initiative of the militants. To give the organizations responsibility and encourage workers to exercise it. To take into account the workers' work habits and the work habits of the militants in developing them. To intensify, strengthen, to the highest and political ends. To combat excessive bureaucracy. It is necessary to make a qualitative improvement in the work style of the party's political organizations;

1.7. To intensify more vigorously the training, learning, promotion and distribution of the cadres, which are essential for a more intensive structuring of the party for the establishment of many more intermediate entities and for a lessening of the overconcentration of work among certain comrades. In training cadres, to take into account the laborers and women in particular. It is necessary to become better acquainted with the cadres through their activity and their behavior, to raise the level of the regular meetings of party entities, to help the cadres surmount difficulties, to hold special meetings and courses, or to encourage their participation in courses that will allow for their political and ideological fitness that is essential for leading the party's political and organizational work a more efficient and capable leadership.

3. To encourage the recruitment of new party members

To direct the recruitment toward the laborers and toward all workers who are prominent in the defense of the common aspirations. To pay particular heed to recruitment in the companies, among the professional classes, in the parishes and the municipalities wherein the organizational entrenchment is weaker. To take into account the need for recruiting many more farmers, many more women and many more young people, particularly in the regions wherein an aging of the organization is noted, and more technical and intellectual cadres. It is necessary to recruit thousands of new comrades from among all those who wish to contribute to the defense of the Portugal of April and to take the path to socialism.

4. To open new Work Centers in the towns, villages and locations where the need for them is felt most keenly. To improve the operation, conditions and utilization of the existing Work Centers. It is necessary to make all the Work Centers good aids for the party's activity.

The organizational campaign of 1981 will be a major success for the party if the various organizations take it over personally, determine concrete goals, act with enthusiasm to attain them and carry out a careful monitoring of the execution during the course of the year.

14 February 1981.

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party.

2909

CSO: 1181/87

MILITARY

SWEDEN

DEFENSE COMMISSION REPORT URGES CIVIL DEFENSE FOR ABC WAR

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Feb 81 p 20

[Article by journalists Ingvar Andersson, Harald Hamrin, Eva Bernback: "Defense Against Nuclear War Disarmed"]

At present, no defense against atomic bombs exists in Sweden. In the Civil Defense Board in Karlstad there is broad agreement on this point. Notwithstanding this fact the objective is to do everything possible to help the citizens in an atomic war. Mr Gunnar Gustafsson, Director General of the Civil Defense Board and a long-time politician for the Social Democrats, expresses the Board's concern when facing the development of nuclear arms: "I am one of those who take the opinion that when intensified efforts are devoted to nuclear arms, this at the same time increases the threat that they actually will be used. I have never understood the notion of developing weapons as deterrents." Today the Defense Commission presents an interim report. One of the proposals in the report is to give higher priority to the defense against atomic weapons.

[Excerpt] We cannot protect ourselves against a total calamity. If you survive the explosion of an atomic bomb, you will have to come to your own rescue--and maybe also to the help of other persons in your close vicinity.

This is the grim view of one of the experts on ABC [chemical, biological, atomic warfare, defense] at the Civil Defense Board. No imaginable precautions can provide any significant relief after such an event.

There is no kind of protective clothing which gives total protection against radiation so even well-equipped rescue squads can only stay short periods in recently-bombed areas after which they must be replaced by new personnel in unused protective clothing.

What, in fact, is available? What kind of preparedness is there against atomic bombs in Sweden? The fact is that the Swedish Total Defense since the Resolution on Defense in 1964 has taken a passive role when it comes to ABC protection and ABC training--this applies to military as well as civil defense. ABC protection

in the civil defense is only envisaged to be developed as a supplement to a defense against conventional warfare and "without any significant additional cost."

So, throughout the seventies Sweden has almost pretended that all atomic bombs around the world have not been our business. The Supreme Commander has judged it to be very unlikely that nuclear warfare would involve Sweden.

Today, however, the second part of the report of the Defense Committee is presented and it proposes increased emphasis on ABC defense including more concrete protective measures such as improved training, more personnel prepared with expert knowledge of ABC, more and better equipment to gauge radioactive radiation.

Our basic means of protection already at hand are:

- Bomb shelters (see below), where presently it is possible "without any significant additional cost" to build thicker walls, to install special filters, airtight hinges, etc. to improve the function of shelters also for ABC warfare.

- Evacuation of urban areas (see below). However, this solution has been found increasingly impracticable considering that society must function also in a time of war.

- Alarm signaling radioactive fallout, primarily through the radio (program 3). Transistorized radios with fresh batteries should be brought to the shelters or in the event of evacuation. Local radio broadcasters have their own organization in war. Using a wide-meshed net of checkpoints throughout the Air Defense, the National Road and Traffic Research Institute, the Civil Defense, the State Railways, etc., fallout can be gauged and preliminary prognoses made and transmitted to the public by radio. This network can be put together in 3 days.

- Protection clothing. Complete protection is only available to those special troops in the Civil Defense, whose primary task is to gauge the fallout at an early stage. There are no clothes that give total protection against radiation. Especially, there is no protection against radiation from gamma rays, which form part of the fallout from all known types of bombs. Clothing protects against radioactive dust.

There are two kinds of protective masks:

- There are now somewhat more than three million protective masks available for civilians and the annual production for adults is 300,000. This means that the supply will run out until new old-fashioned masks become obsolete. Production of masks for children has just begun at an annual rate of 10,000. Protective masks protect against gas and toxins and against inhaling radioactive dust, but they do not protect against direct radiation following bombardment. The filter in the mask also becomes another source of radiation which, however, is preferable to inhaling the dust into your lungs. Protective masks can be obtained from the

civil defense troops but, as earlier stated, only in an insufficient number, and they must be individually adapted to fulfill their functions.

--Health care is organized by the Social Welfare Board and the Civil Defense Board recommends improved coordination. Everybody up to 70 years of age who has received medical training has a duty to serve in the event of war and has also, in advance, been assigned specific tasks.

--Training of civil defense units. Around 200,000 persons have received a rather comprehensive training and their duty is to serve in the various specialized units of the civil defense. Of the week-long courses only a few hours are set aside for defense against nuclear warfare and this kind of instruction is given, primarily, to personnel in commanding functions. The training of specialized units, with expert knowledge on ABC warfare, has been totally halted pending a discussion on their usefulness. Of the 244 units envisaged only a few have been trained so far and, in addition, a few commanding officers.

--Training in personal protection involves around 180,000 persons annually, who voluntarily apply for such instruction. The training is given by the Civil Defense, but out of the three courses of 4 to 6 hours each only limited time is devoted to ABC defense. Demand from the public is larger than can be met by the Civil Defense and related organizations.

--Psychological preparedness is most effectively obtained by training, but the Civil Defense today has no knowledge about the reactions of people in a situation where they and their children are threatened by imperceptible radioactivity. However, a discussion about this has begun. This discussion also involves the Research Institute of the National Defense (FOA) and the National Preparedness Commission for Psychological Defense. At the Civil Defense in Karlstad a group of sociologists, nuclear physicists and other experts has been studying such questions for the last 6 months. In the fall of 1981 the group will present a preliminary basic view, but today they only reveal that there is only a very limited number of situations available for investigation as to how people react confronted with the threat of radioactivity.

There Are Not Enough Shelters

The number of available shelters is insufficient for the population of Stockholm. In some areas there is a very severe shortage. In the inner city of Stockholm there is room for 43,100 persons in shelters but the population is 380,500. This means that shelter can only be provided for one out of nine.

The need for shelters in the inner city cannot be covered by new construction, the Civil Defense Division at the Stockholm County Administration states.

The main contributing factor to the shortage is that shelters in Stockholm have only been built during the last 40 years. Before 1940 shelters were not required. Not until the Second World War was there a law enacted demanding all new buildings to have shelters. It could be said that the war--the development of arms and military strategy--forced the building of shelters for civilians.

And the advancement of weapons continued. During the fifties atomic bombs had reached such sizes and could have such devastating effects that it was realized that shelters no longer would be of any help. In 1957, the obligation to build shelters was discontinued for the 14 biggest cities.

During the sixties and the first half of the seventies--the record-setting years in Sweden when construction of new buildings reached its historical peak--no shelters were built in the inner areas of the cities.

In 1976 the requirement to build shelters also in the bigger cities was reintroduced. The advancement of weapons had altered military strategic thinking. Military people started talking about "limited" nuclear warfare using "small bombs," bombs which one could survive in a shelter if they did not explode too close to it.

Everybody Should Have Access To A Shelter

Since 1976 the objective is that everybody living in high-risk cities--so-called shelter cities--should have access to a shelter where they work as well as where they live. The government decides which cities should be named shelter cities. Stockholm is a shelter city.

In each shelter city the local authorities are expected to study the demand for and the supply of shelters and to take initiatives to redress shortages. Since the society must function as normally as possible also in a war as few persons as possible will be evacuated. Consequently, shelters will be needed both where people live and where they work. If the bomb falls during the night the home shelter shall be used, if the bomb falls during the day an office shelter is available.

In Stockholm, the shelter problem is studied by the Civil Defense Division of the County Administration. The investigation has revealed severe deficiencies: If Stockholm is the target of a nuclear (or conventional) bomb attack one citizen out of ten must stay outside the shelters. In some areas the situation is even worse. Normally 10,000 persons dwell during daytime around Stureplan-Nybroplan, but there is not one single shelter. But there are also areas with an abundance of shelters. Generally speaking, there is a surplus in the large apartment districts that were built in the fifties and sixties.

In areas built before the forties and in all one-family house areas the shortages are worse. This also applies to areas--such as the inner city and Bromma--which were excluded from the obligation to build shelters in the period 1957-1976.

"This is not acceptable," says P. A. Berntsson, who is the person responsible for questions relating to shelters at the Civil Defense Division at the County Administration.

"Sweden's defense budget amounts to 17 billion," says Berntsson, "238 million are allocated to shelters, the rest is used by the military forces. The question might be raised why the military forces are so much more important than the civilian population."

Shelters in all buildings constructed after 1976 must have ABC protection. The shelter shall endure attacks by nuclear weapons and by biological or chemical weapons. The resistance to nuclear weapons is, of course, related to the distance from the bomb explosion--from a distance of around 1 kilometer there is a good chance of surviving a limited nuclear detonation. Those who have no access to shelters will have to find other ways of protection: from covering their heads with newspapers to staying in deep concrete basements. The further down the better but there is also the risk of being entrapped or killed by collapsing buildings to be considered.

The Subway Might Be Dangerous

From time to time it has been said that the subway gives good protection but the county administration warns of this. Large parts of the subway system are below the water level of the lake Malaren and there is a great risk that a bomb will force the tunnels to collapse after which they will be filled with water. Instead of being protected people would be drowned.

In many apartment houses in Stockholm one can find so-called protected areas in the basements. These areas do not give full protection but they are better than no protection at all. The county administration has a clear picture of these areas and if a heightened stage of preparedness is declared these areas shall be put in order.

Nobody really knows how an owner of a one-family house is supposed to act. The Civil Defense Board and the Research Institute of the National Defense have discussed the possibility of developing a simple and inexpensive shelter which the owner himself can bury in his backyard. The Civil Defense Board has also compiled advice for those who want to build their own shelters. In England and West Germany selling shelters to owners of one-family houses has become an expanding business. These shelters--radiation-proof and with supplies for several months--are supposed to provide a chance to survive nuclear war. "The only effective life insurance available" is the selling argument.

Kills Without Being Noticed

Ionizing radiation--often wrongly called radioactive radiation--is emitted in atomic bomb explosions and gives another dimension to atomic weapons.

Apart from killing directly through the shock wave and the heat, atomic weapons also kill in an invisible way. A human being has no senses adapted to registering radiation--it has no smell, no taste and it cannot be seen or heard.

People may die months or even years later. Those who thought they had been spared suddenly realize that they are victims. Those who really were unscathed will live in constant fear of being injured.

Acute radiation injuries appear within a few hours or up to 2 months after the exposure to radiation. The mildest form is nausea and if no additional symptoms appear one can always hope to avoid getting cancer at a later date.

The higher the exposure to radiation, the more severe injuries appear. At 300 rad 50 percent die within approximately one week, at 500 rad everybody dies. Further increased radiation only changes the picture insofar as people will die earlier.

Among later injuries from radiation one includes injuries related to the thyroid, which may lead to mental retardation. To guard against this kind of injury iodine tablets will be distributed shortly in areas close to the Swedish nuclear plants.

Another kind of late injury affects unborn fetuses--women who were pregnant when the bomb detonated risk giving birth to defective children. Other late injuries are cancer and genetic defects. In Japan, after 35 years, the two bombs over Nagasaki and Hiroshima still cause people to die from cancer.

The Small Community Of Varnas Will Take Care Of 42,000 Persons

The evacuation plans are obsolete and will be revised, says the Civil Defense Board in Karlstad and stresses that an evacuation of the big cities will only be used as a matter of last resort to be implemented if there is an imminent threat of terror bombing over major cities.

The possibility of evacuation should only be viewed as a supplement to shelters--this is the result of the last year's rethinking by the Civil Defense. Close to 85 percent of Sweden's population now lives in densely populated areas and an evacuation would lead to a total breakdown of our society. Production, distribution of food and energy and other essential functions of the society would cease if evacuation were put into force.

There is, however, a conflict between the a-defense (defense against atomic bombs) and the defense against conventional warfare. The most effective a-defense implies evacuation, which means dispersing the population all over the country to minimize the number of killed and injured from an attack by atomic bombs. But an evacuation during a conventional war could even increase the dangers for the civilian population, which risks finding itself in the combat zone.

The latest evacuation plan was drawn up in 1967 and since that time about one million Swedes have moved from the countryside to densely populated areas. This is, however, the plan that all Swedes have in their homes, in the last pages of their telephone directories.

"If the last page... The evacuation plans of the Civil Defense" are widely spread in all Swedish homes and offices. After the letter U in the telephone directory there follows a few pages containing elementary information on what to do in the event of war. These pages replace the pamphlet that was distributed to the households in the sixties.

The total defense organizations at that time judged telephone directories to be widely distributed and easy to get access to, and even if people generally do not have them, this is the place to look for information they will be told so by the media in a crisis situation.

Brochure Ready For Printing

A more comprehensive brochure of about 30 pages is prepared but not printed at the Preparedness Commission for Psychological Defense. The brochure has recently been reviewed and renewed and is now in the hands of the government, which will decide on rapid printing and distribution in an emergency situation.

This brochure devotes around two-pages to the defense against atomic bombs and radioactive contamination. A few sentences deal with the injuries to human beings caused by radioactive radiation, but nothing is said about how to treat people exposed to radiation.

If you take a look in the evacuation plan, now 14 years old, to find out what it says about Stockholm you will find that those people living in the parishes of Kungsholmen and Hasselby are to go to Varnas in Varmland. Varnas is a junction between two roads in the parish of Norra Ny, in the municipality of Torsby, population close to 100. The parishes of Kungsholmen and Hasselby have a combined population of 42,700.

Varnas is just a co-ordinating point for all these people and from this place the Stockholmers are to be dispersed around the whole municipality. The population of Norra Ny is at present 1,800 and that of Torsby is 15,600--a number which is constantly declining. Consequently, the evacuation plan implies an almost fourfold increase in the population of the municipality of Torsby.

"That will result in a chaos," comments Bengt Bjorelius, chief administrator in Torsby. "That plan is not in force anymore...so, you say it is still printed in the Stockholm directory? Well, our municipality has expressed its opinion on this matter and it is supposed to be reviewed."

94,000 To Bjursås

Here are other examples of the intended dispersion of Stockholm's population:

People from the parishes of Matteus, Gustav Vasa, Adolf Fredrik, Johannes, Klara and Jacob, as well as Tabby, are to go to Bjursås, Dalarna, with a population of 3,670. The total number evacuated: 94,400.

Those who live in the parish of St Goran, together with the people from Sollentuna, Djursholm and Danderyd, are to go to Hedemora, Dalarna, with a population of 17,000. The number of Stockholmers involved is 98,000.

Naturally, a great number of Stockholmers have a duty to serve in various parts of the defense or civil defense, and they will not be evacuated in a war situation. But there are also situations requiring "emergency evacuation" as the directory calls it (atomic war by mistake, radioactive fallout approaching across the Baltic Sea...). Under the directory's headline "EVACUATION" one advice is this: Keep the family together.

A Secret Book On Nuclear Weapons

In the Swedish defense, nuclear training has been drastically cut during the last 20 years. But the tide is turning again. It is the view of military people as well as of scientists at the Research Institute of the National Defense (FOA) that now is the time to give more consideration to nuclear weapons and to the role of the defense in a nuclear attack on Sweden.

A result of this is a handbook on ABC-weapons (atomic, biological and chemical weapons) now being prepared by the Defense Staff in collaboration with the FOA, the staffs of the service branches, the Defense Materiel Board and the Fortifications Administration. The handbook, which so far is available only in a preliminary version, bears the title "OB Grundsyn ABC" [The Supreme Commander's Basic Views on ABC], and is classified as confidential information. A final version, which also will be classified, is expected sometime in 1982.

"We have earlier had similar material," says Nils Lundell, a Colonel at the Defense Staff. "But this is the first time we will have a comprehensive document on this issue."

The objective behind "OB Grundsyn ABC" is to give a comprehensive description of the views of the Swedish Defense in relation to nuclear weapons, their performance, use and effects and how to protect yourself against them.

"Following the defense decisions during the sixties there was a distinct decline in our training and thinking about these matters," says Lundell.

Defense Against Conventional War

The reason for this is--according to those who have followed the course of events--the defense decisions of the sixties and seventies, explicitly stating that the Swedish defense was to be designed for conventional warfare.

Goran Franzen, department head at the FOA and one of the co-authors of "OB Grundsyn ABC" takes a critical view towards the toning down of the discussion about nuclear weapons in the sixties and seventies. "In the fifties and the early sixties the view was that military forces would be able to operate in a nuclear environment," he says. "But around 1960 there was a change of opinion. Generally, speaking, the existence of nuclear weapons was neglected in most of military training and in the procurement of supplies."

Reduced Training

A certain part of the expert training succeeded in "living through the winter." This relates, i.e., to the Defense Protective School at I 1, Kungsängen, outside Stockholm, where drafted protective engineers have been trained.

"But the general level of knowledge of commanding officers has deteriorated drastically," he says.

Tor Larsson, Head of Department at the FOA, has also taken part in the drafting of "OB Grundsyn ABC."

"Firstly, it will serve as a basis for the procurement of supplies to the defense forces, for example protective equipment. Secondly, the aim is to increase general awareness about non-conventional arms. Such an increased awareness should result in a military defense which does not immediately collapse in the event of a limited nuclear attack on Sweden.

Both he and Goran Frenzen are aware that the Swedish defense never will be able to stand up against a massive nuclear attack. But there is, according to them, a "gray zone" characterized by a "limited nuclear attack" on Sweden.

"If such an attack occurs the military defense must not collapse, it must be able to perform a credible defense. This comes first. Secondly, the military forces must help the civilian population to survive or, in other words, contribute to the defense of the civilian population."

"OB Grundsyn ABC" will not be definitive until the presently appointed Defense Commission has concluded its work. A major reason is that the Defense Staff and the FOA have waited for the interim report, which is being presented today. But already the interim report published in 1979 gives an indication of an increased interest in nuclear weapons and their effects on Sweden's defense policy and strategic situation.

9608

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BRIEFS

MINESWEEPERS ORDERED--Two plastic mine-sweeping craft ordered by the government are to be built at the Karlskrona Shipbuilding Works. The boats will receive weapons and mine-clearing outfitting amounting to significant costs. The deliveries will take place in 1984. The boats will be built of fiberglass plastic. The two minesweepers will be the largest naval vessels ever built according to this method. "Plastic hulls provide good protection against magnetic mines. They are certainly somewhat more expensive than conventional hulls of wood or steel. But in return they are stronger and cheaper to maintain," asserted the Defense Ministry. The new 310-displacement-ton ships will be 45 meters long and will have a beam of 10 meters. "Mine-sweeping has an entirely new mission within the Swedish Navy. With the aid of a new type search apparatus the ocean bottom can be searched. Mines discovered are identified by a TV camera in an unmanned submarine craft, from which explosives are dropped and detonated by remote control, thus disabling the mines," the Defense Ministry reported. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 May 81 p 7]

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